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1. Introduction 
 
The current economic and financial crisis is considered to be the worst recession since the 
“Great Depression” in the 1930s. Some argue that it is even worse than that. Not only that 
many economies around the globe experience negative GDP growth rates, but also large parts 
of the banking system came into severe difficulties thereby causing a threat for the stability of 
the overall financial system. Under these circumstances, central banks in most industrial 
countries have lowered their key short-term interest rate targets to nearly zero.  
However, as it turned out, in these extraordinary times “traditional” monetary policy 
responses in terms of variations of interest rate targets might not be sufficient in order to 
successfully master the current challenges. As a consequence, many central banks introduced 
so called “unconventional” monetary policy measures, which are generally summarized under 
the term “Quantitative Easing (QE)”. The concrete actions attributable to QE can be 
subdivided into “active” and “passive” QE. Active QE, which is at the discretion of the 
central bank, refers to outright purchases of government securities or other assets. Passive QE, 
on the other hand, is at the discretion of the central bank’s counterparty and means that 
counterparties can approach the central bank to obtain funds, given their ability to provide 
eligible collateral. Both have in common that aim to achieve certain – often country specific – 
targets by increasing the overall liquidity in the banking system.  
The Bank of England (BoE), for example, announced in March 2009 to purchase GBP 75 
billion of assets via reverse auctions because it feared that the achievement of its final target – 
an inflation rate (CPI) of 2 percent – is in danger. In May, the UK’s central bank decided to 
provide additional GBP 50 billion for further asset purchases. The BoE’s QE approach 
focuses primarily on the purchase of government debt (“gilts”). In addition, also corporate 
bonds are included. The introduction of QE in the UK was accompanied by a policy shift that 
places a higher weight on the quantity of money supplied rather than the short-term interest 
rate (“bank rate”). And also the European Central Bank (ECB) is active on the fields of 
unconventional monetary policy. In fact, as the current ECB president Jean-Claude Trichet 
points out, the European central bank was “the first central bank to take non-standard 
measures” by providing “additional liquidity to banks with immediate liquidity needs” at the 
beginning of August 2007. Since the banking system is more important for corporate 
financing in Europe than in Anglo-Saxon countries like the US or the UK, its primary 
concerns are the strains in the banking system. To face these strains, the ECB started very 
early to follow a “fixed rate full allotment” approach under which, in contrast to the 
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previously applied variable rate tender procedure, commercial banks can obtain as much 
liquidity as they want at the prevailing interest rate target. In addition to this, the European 
central bank considerably increased the maturity (up to 12 months) and frequency of its 
liquidity-providing operations as well as the range of eligible collateral. The most recent (May 
2009) measure announced by the ECB is a purchase program to buy covered bonds of about 
€60 billion, which can be considered as active QE. However, the primary focus of the ECB’s 
use of unconventional monetary policy lies, as just mentioned, on the extension of its existing 
liquidity-providing facilities, by which it heavily and also at an early stage of the current crisis 
increased the liquidity within the banking system. The problem pressure the American central 
bank (Fed) is currently facing is, to a certain degree, comparable to the one its European 
counterpart has to deal with: In both areas, fighting the strains in the banking system became 
one of the main tasks of monetary policy. In order to do so, the Fed relies on a threefold 
approach: First, it provides liquidity to banks and depository institutions on a short-term basis. 
For example, it introduced a liquidity-providing standing facility for primary dealers 
(“Primary Dealer Credit Facility”), which are not allowed to obtain funding through 
“traditional” standing facilities. Secondly, due to the comparably high significance of capital 
markets for corporate financing in the US, the Fed engages directly with borrowers and 
investors in key credit markets. And thirdly, it introduced several purchase programs for long-
term government securities (up to $300 billion) as well as for government-sponsored 
enterprise debt and mortgage backed securities (up to $200 billion and up to $1.25 trillion, 
respectively).  
Yet QE is not a phenomenon of the current crisis, it had been implemented for the first time 
more than eight years ago: The Bank of Japan (BoJ), having unsuccessfully tried to end 
deflation and recession, opted for a radical policy change and introduced the then unknown 
QE-policy in March 2001. When the Fed announced to engage in outright purchases of certain 
problematic assets as well as of government securities, many commentators made 
oversimplifying cross references to the Japanese QE-policy between 2001 and 2006. 
However, as Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke points out, the Japanese QE approach differs 
fundamentally from the QE approach the Fed currently pursues. In fact, when talking about 
the Fed’s current monetary policy, he refers to “Credit Easing (CE)”, which he opposes to QE 
as pursued by the BoJ.  
It is therefore the aim of this diploma thesis to examine the differences between QE applied 
by the BoJ between 2001 and 2006 and the current QE policy pursued by the American 
central bank (although Bernanke calls the Fed’s approach CE, for reasons of easier 
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comparison I will refer to QE most of the time). The questions I try to answer are what 
different macroeconomic and financial developments forced the to two central banks under 
considerations to believe that their respective toolkits of conventional monetary policy 
instruments are not sufficient for addressing these developments, in which way their 
respective QE regimes differ from each other, how these differences affected certain variables 
like the size of the central bank balance sheet and finally to what extend today’s US and 
Japanese  monetary and also fiscal policy decision makers took into consideration the 
experiences Japan made in the last two decades when trying to address the current strains in 
the financial system and in the economy as a whole. For this purpose I proceed as follows: 
After reviewing the range of traditional monetary policy instruments at the disposal of the Fed 
and the BoJ, I focus on the economic conditions prior to the introduction of QE in the US and 
Japan, respectively. This is the basis for a close examination of commonalities and differences 
between the two QE regimes, which is done in the following part. I conclude with an 
evaluation of the implemented measures.  
The main findings are as follows: First, the BoJ formally introduced QE on a certain date and 
also explicitly used the words “Quantitative Easing”. The Fed, on the other hand, neither used 
the term “Quantitative Easing” in its official statements (also not “Credit Easing”) nor was 
there a formal starting date. Secondly, although there are certainly parallels between the 
particular macroeconomic and financial environments that form the motivation behind the 
implementation of “unconventional” monetary policy measures by the two central banks 
under consideration, the differences in the economic performance are nevertheless the factors 
that shape the respective QE policies the most: Whereas the Japanese economy suffered from 
a prolonged deflation, the distinctive characteristics of the current US recession are severe 
problems within the banking system. Hence, the primary aim of QE in Japan was fighting 
deflation, whereas the American central bank addresses mostly strains in the banking system. 
Thirdly, the two QE approaches differ fundamentally with respect to their main policy targets. 
The BoJ switched from short-term interest rates to total reserves of commercial banks held at 
the central bank (i.e. the BoJ). The Fed, in contrast, keeps targeting short-term interest rates. 
This is clearly reflected in the respective monetary policy arrangements, which leads us to the 
fourth ground on which differences can be identified: QE by the BoJ consisted to a good deal 
of active QE in terms of outright purchases of Japanese government securities (JGBs), 
whereas the Fed currently follows a somewhat broader approach: Since interbank markets are 
not functioning as desired, it tries to engage with as many market participants as direct as 
possible. Therefore the Fed has introduced a much broader range of new instruments than its 
 4 
Japanese counterpart did between 2001 and 2006. As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet 
expansion was considerably larger than the one in Japan. (see Bernanke 2009a; Bank of 
England 2009; Trichet 2009; Pradhan 2009; Eichengreen/O’Rourke 2009).  
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2. “Conventional” Monetary Policy Instruments 
 
Already 1969, Nobel Prize-winning Milton Friedman points out three main objectives that 
central banks should achieve when conducting monetary policy. The first one – “preventing 
money itself from being a major source of economic disturbance” – is, albeit appearing to be 
trivial, arguably the most important one. Having in mind the severe monetary policy mistakes 
by the Fed, that exacerbated the Great Depression in the 1930s, Friedman concludes that a 
central bank should “avoid drastic and erratic changes of direction”. His second proposition, 
“keeping the machine well oiled”, refers to the fact that a basic prerequisite for prospering 
economies are stable but also flexible prices and wages. At long last, monetary policy should 
in principle also focus on “offsetting major disturbances in the economic system arising from 
other sources”, although he stresses the limitations of monetary policy in dealing with 
disturbances in general (see Friedman 1968, p. 12-14). 
Nowadays, a good deal of Friedman´s proposals is commonly agreed upon as being the main 
final targets a central bank should strive to achieve. The importance, however, that the big 
central banks attach each of these objectives, differs from institution to institution. Whereas 
Japan’s central bank primarily aims at “achieving price stability, thereby contributing to the 
sound development of the national economy” (see Bank of Japan 1997), the Fed’s mandate 
incorporates a broader range of objectives, namely “maximum employment, stable prices, and 
moderate long-term interest rates” (see The Federal Reserve Board 2008). So while the BoJ 
sees stabilizing the price level as its main responsibility, the Fed has three final targets of 
which price stability is merely one of them. 
Achieving a certain final target, however, stands at the end of a rather long chain of monetary 
policy implementation, which consists of an operational target, an operational framework that 
enables the central bank to control the operational target and finally the use of monetary 
policy instruments in order to achieve the operational target. The connection between the 
operational target and the final target is made via an intermediate target, that can be controlled 
or at least influenced through the operational target and that has a stable relationship with the 
final target. In the particular case of the Fed and the BoJ, the operational target is in both 
cases the overnight market interest rate, which is called “federal funds rate” in the former and 
“uncollateralized overnight call rate” in the latter case. The operational framework determines 
the range of available instruments, the counterparts with whom a central bank should conduct 
business and the range of eligible collateral. All these aspects will be discussed in the 
following subchapters. The intermediate target is usually constituted by a monetary aggregate, 
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M1 for example, though the importance of monetary aggregates as intermediate targets 
declined in recent years to some extend (Bindseil 2004, p. 7-9).  
What now follows is a description of the instruments – including their requirements and the 
involved counterparties – modern central banks in general and the two monetary institutions 
discussed in detail use to exert control over short-term interest rates. 
 
2.1. Open Market Operations 
The following part outlines the general procedure as well as the specific characteristics of 
open market operations in the US and Japan prior to the introduction of QE. These operations, 
which are essential for the implementation of monetary policy, can be divided into two main 
subgroups, namely outright transactions and (reverse) repurchase agreements. 
Today, open market operations are regarded as the most important class of monetary policy 
instruments for influencing short-term interest rates.  Though there are different types of such 
operations, they have some commonalities. In contrast to standing facilities, which will be 
discussed below, they are only conducted at the discretion of the central bank. Therefore, if 
one considers “ideal” open market operations, it is not possible for market participants to 
anticipate its implementation (see Bindseil 2004, p.145-147). In practice, however, many 
central banks (the ECB, for example) conduct (at least certain types of) open market 
operations on a regular basis (see ECB 2002, p. 7).  
Concerning the procedure of liquidity-provision or liquidity-absorption, regardless of the type 
of open market operation, fixed-rate or variable-rate tender procedures have become the main 
tool for open market transactions between the central banks and eligible counterparties. If, for 
instance, a monetary institution decides to provide liquidity through a fixed-rate tender, it pre-
announces the interest rate at which the counterparties can submit the amounts they wish to 
obtain. Unfortunately, this procedure has some important limitations, mostly because 
counterparties tend to bid for larger amounts than they actually want to obtain since they 
know that the actual amount allotted to them is just a fraction of their initial bid. This problem 
can be avoided by applying variable-rate tenders, where bidders are asked to submit 
rate/quantity pairs, which results in a downward-sloping demand curve. Now the central bank 
has to choose a marginal rate. All bids that lie above this particular interest rate and a 
predetermined minimum bid rate will be fully allotted, whereas rate/quantity pairs below the 
marginal rate will be refused. Bids that have been submitted exactly at the marginal rate will 
be allotted concerning to an allotment ratio that has to be specified by the central bank. The 
counterpart to fixed-rate as well as variable-rate tenders are bilateral operations, where the 
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central bank engages directly with one or more counterparties, which could also include sales 
on the stock exchange. However, this kind of transaction procedure is barely used (see 
Bindseil 2004, p.162-163).    
 
2.1.1. Outright Transactions 
Regarding the different types of open market operations, outright transactions, which include 
purchases or sales of securities, are primarily used for structural liquidity-provision or for  
liquidity-absorption from the banking system. In general, both the Fed and the BoJ try to 
avoid draining reserves by creating a so called “structural liquidity deficit”, whereby they 
inject less liquidity through outright purchases than is demanded so that there ideally remains 
a constant need to add reserves, which is typically done via reverse operations (see Bindseil 
2004, p.154-155 and BIS 2001, p. 17-18).   
 
2.1.1.1. USA 
In the US, outright transactions and open market operations in general are carried out by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York on behalf of the Federal Reserve, which, in turn, has been 
authorized by its central decision-making body, the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC). At the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, the division in charge of open market 
operations is called the “Open Market Trading Desk” or, in short, the “Desk”. Although the 
operational target is the uncollateralized lending rate between banks – the federal funds rate – 
the Desk actually conducts business mostly with so called “primary dealers”, which are banks 
and securities brokers. This procedure nonetheless affects reserves of the banking system held 
at the Fed since all primary dealers have clearing accounts at depository institutions. These 
accounts are used for the transactions between the Fed and the primary dealers. Thus, clearing 
account movements also lead to fluctuations of reserve holdings. In general, the Desk tries to 
achieve through its open market operations an equilibrium of supply of and demand for 
Federal Reserve balances at the prevailing federal funds target rate. If a deficit or surplus of 
reserves is perceived to be structural, the Desk conducts outright purchases or sales of assets 
through variable-rate tender procedures.  Even though the domestic “System Open Market 
Account (SOMA)”, which administrates all domestic securities held outright, accounts for the 
bulk of total reserves supplied through open market operations (Chart1) (stock variable, 
average of 2006, so before financial turmoil started: $762.478 billion), reverse operations 
(stock variable, average of 2006: $24.863 billion, see The Federal Reserve Board 2009) are 
far more common.  
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When considering an outright transaction, the Desk has to pay attention to aspects like the 
maturity of the security or the liquidity of the relevant market. Therefore, the Desk generally 
focuses on US Treasury securities since the respective market is the broadest and most liquid 
one in the US. Concerning the maturity of the securities, the Federal Reserve imposed 
guidelines limiting the percentage share of certain maturities in its portfolio to avoid 
distortions of the yield curve, allowing for larger amounts of short-term securities. As a result, 
in 2006 about half of the securities in the SOMA portfolio had a maturity of one year or less 
(Chart2) (see Bindseil 2004, p. 155 and 163; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2005, p. 35-39; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2007a, p. 14-24; Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York 2007b). 
 
2.1.1.2. Japan 
Japan’s central bank does, like the Fed, focus on the overnight market interest rate – the 
uncollateralized overnight call rate – as the operational target. But whereas monetary policy 
implementation in the US relies heavily upon transactions between the Federal Reserve and a 
limited number of primary dealers – 19 as of September 2008 – the circle of eligible 
counterparties in Japan is larger: Prior to the introduction of QE, it ranged from about 30 to 
50, depending on the type of transaction and has been expanded considerably after 2001. 
Counterparties can be banks, securities companies, securities finance companies and money 
market brokers. In contrast to US primary dealers, however, all of them have to maintain 
reserve accounts at the BoJ. In general, Japan’s central bank conducts more open market 
operations, or rather repurchase transactions, than its American counterpart: While the first 
one has to engage in open market operations several times a day to offset undesired liquidity 
fluctuations, the latter one conducts such transactions typically just once a day. The reasons 
for this might be the higher volatility in autonomous factors, such as banknotes in circulation, 
as well as the illiquidity of some market segments in Japan. This could also serve as an 
explanation for the higher spectrum of instruments at the disposal of the BoJ. Before turning 
to the concrete design of outright transactions in Japan, it should be noted that many of the 
instruments in the toolbox of the BoJ have only recently been introduced. Some forms of 
outright transactions and reverse operations as late as the end of the 20th century. The reason 
for this was the BoJ’s focus on its lending rates to banks as the primary monetary policy 
instrument. This was necessary due to the underdevelopment of the Japanese securities 
market, which made open market operations very difficult. In 1962, however, with bond and 
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bills markets becoming more and more liquid, the BoJ started focusing on open market 
operations in order to achieve its policy goals.   
If the Policy Board, which is the BoJ’s decision-making body, perceives that there is a 
structural shortfall of reserves, it conducts outright purchases of long-term Japanese 
government bonds (JGBs) with maturities ranging from 10 to 20 years via flexible-rate tender 
(Chart 3, note: the MPM on May 18, 2001 decided to extend the range of eligible JGBs, 
therefore also JGBs with a maturity of less than 10 years are included in the graph because 
earlier data was not available. Anyway, their total amount was still not significant at that 
time). The total amount bought should, on average, match the net increase in banknotes (Chart 
4). Currently the BoJ purchases long-term JGBs on an outright basis about twice a month.  
In contrast to the Fed, the BoJ also conducts outright purchases on a daily basis to address 
temporary liquidity-needs. Therefore, it purchases short-term government securities, namely 
Treasury bills (TBs) and financing bills (FBs). Yet two of the BoJ’s short-term outright 
transactions differ somewhat from the usual definition of this monetary policy instrument: 
The first variation includes buying so called “master bills”, which are bills issued by 
counterparties solely for the purpose of engaging in transactions with the BoJ. These bills, in 
turn, are backed by a pool of eligible collateral. The second variation of outright transactions 
implies purchasing bills collateralized by eligible corporate debt obligations, such as 
corporate bonds or asset-backed securities. All of these short-term outright transactions have 
in common that the maturity of the assets bought under such arrangements normally does not 
exceed 4 months. Finally, it should be mentioned that the BoJ conducts more repurchase than 
outright transactions, whereas the majority of funds is provided through the latter open market 
instrument (Chart 5). And in general, far more liquidity-providing than liquidity-absorbing 
operations are conducted. Obviously this pattern resembles the one described above when 
discussing the Fed. Concerning liquidity-absorbing outright transactions, the BoJ has the 
possibility to sell JGBs for addressing long-lasting liquidity-surpluses as well as TBs, FBs and 
bills issued by the BOJ with a maturity of up 3 months for reducing liquidity on a short-term 
basis (see BIS 2001, p.12, p. 17-19, p. 28-33, p. 47; Bank of Japan 2004a, p. 124-125; Bank 
of Japan 2007b; Bank of Japan 2009b; Bank of Japan 2008a, p. 15-17). 
 
2.1.2. (Reverse) Repurchase Agreements  
In contrast to outright transactions, (reverse) repurchase agreements are used to (absorb) 
provide liquidity on a temporary basis. This implies that the central bank does not ultimately 
buy or sell assets but rather buys or sells assets while at the same time predetermining a fixed 
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date in the future for returning or re-obtaining the asset. For the duration of the transaction, 
the ownership rights of the assets are transferred to the buyer. Such transactions are mainly 
used for addressing short-lived liquidity fluctuations that might drive the short-term interest 
rate too far away from the target rate (see Bindseil 2004, p.156; ECB 2002 p. 82).  
 
2.1.2.1. USA 
In the US, it was not until the 1970s that (reverse) repurchase agreements became the 
dominant monetary policy tool for addressing temporary deviations from the reserve levels 
consistent with the federal funds rate. Nowadays, the Fed arranges such transactions on a very 
frequent basis, with short-term repos, especially those with overnight maturity, accounting for 
the vast majority of repurchase agreements: In 2006, 247 repos with a maturity of not more 
than 13 days had been arranged, compared to just a weekly long-term repo with a maturity of 
14 days. As noted earlier, central banks try to create a “structural liquidity deficit” to avoid 
draining reserves. As a consequence, reversed repurchase agreements, which aim at absorbing 
liquidity from the banking system, have not been conducted at all in 2006. Concerning the 
range of eligible collateral, the Desk conducts three different operations simultaneously. In 
the first tranche, only Treasury securities are eligible. The second, in addition to Treasury 
securities, also allows for federal agency obligations. While these two types of collateral are 
also eligible in the third trance, primary dealers, who are the Desk’s counterparts, may also try 
to obtain reserves in exchange for mortgage-backed agency debt. After all bids have been 
submitted, the Desk decides upon the allotment amount across the three trances according to 
the attractiveness of each bid relative to the market price of the respective type of collateral. 
Yet in practice most of the allotted reserves have been collateralized by Treasury securities 
(2006: 78% of all outstanding repos, see Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2007a, p. 19). 
Critics argue, however, that, in case of severe market disturbances, in which not all types of 
collateral might be available at reasonable prices, the Fed’s range of collateral accepted at 
repurchase agreements could turn out to be too narrow (see Bindseil 2004, p. 158-159; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2007a, p. 16-19; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2005, p. 39-40). 
 
2.1.2.2. Japan 
The BoJ relies, just like the Fed, heavily upon – due to the structural liquidity deficit mostly 
liquidity-providing – repurchase agreements to address short-dated liquidity fluctuations. The 
frequency of operations, however, is higher in Japan than in the US: While the Fed enters the 
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market typically on a daily basis, the BoJ conducts repurchase transactions several times a 
day. Another difference regards the range of eligible collateral: whereas the Fed accepts 
merely government securities, government agency debt obligations or obligations that are 
fully backed by those agencies, the BoJ follows a broader approach, which manifests itself in 
the set of repos the Japanese central bank can choose from. Apart from purchasing JGBs, TBs 
and FBs under such an arrangement, the BoJ has also the possibility to buy commercial 
papers (CPs) issued by non-financial companies, with TBs and FBs accounting for the bulk of 
collateral used in the BoJ’s repos. The maturities of these transactions range from 3 to 12 
months, which is considerably higher than in the US. A somewhat different kind of liquidity-
provision under repurchase agreements are funds-supplying operations against pooled 
collateral, which is a loan with a maturity of up to 1 year. The pool of collateral is quite 
extensive, including a variety of government, government-backed and private obligations.  If, 
on the other hand, the BoJ decides to absorb liquidity via reverse repurchase agreements, it 
can do so by selling JGBs, TBs, FBs. These operations are, however, like in the other country 
under consideration, relatively rare (see BIS 2001, p. 17-19, p. 28-33, p. 47; Bank of Japan 
2007a; Bank of Japan 2009a; Bank of Japan 2008a, p. 15-17).  
 
2.2. Standing Facilities 
Analogous to the preceding subsection, the following two parts deal with standing facilities 
and reserve requirements – two other means of monetary policy that have a certain 
significance for achieving the operational target. Again, a theoretical assessment of these two 
instruments is followed by the practical implementation in the US and Japan. 
Though nowadays open market operations are the most important means of monetary policy 
implementation, this has not always been the case. Until the 1920s, standing facilities have 
not only been the oldest but also the most important monetary policy instrument. Its most 
striking difference from open market operations is the fact that eligible counterparties can use 
standing facilities at their discretion at any desired moment during business hours. In 
principle, one can distinguish between borrowing and deposit facilities. Whereas the first type 
is usually set above the overnight market interest rate and is liquidity-providing, the latter one 
has only recently been introduced by some central banks and serves as a liquidity-absorbing 
instrument. Today, borrowing facilities are usually designed as so called “Lombard facilities”. 
Under such an arrangement, the central bank grants a credit with a certain maturity – usually 
overnight – to counterparties, which in turn have to deposit eligible collateral. Standing 
facilities, especially the more important liquidity-providing facilities, contribute substantially 
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to steering short-term interest rates. In the absence of such instruments, interest rates could 
exhibit extreme volatility. If, for example, a depository institution fails to obtain funds 
through open market operations or an expected payment from a counterparty has not been 
made, it can borrow funds at the borrowing facility. Furthermore, borrowing facilities 
contribute to the stability of the financial system, since banks can overcome temporary 
liquidity needs in case of either not smoothly functioning financial markets (for example a 
“credit crunch”) or individual financial difficulties that could lead to the collapse of the 
depository institution. Eligible collateral, however, is always essential for obtaining funds 
through borrowing facilities. Over the last years, though, widespread consensus has emerged 
among central banks that stabilizing functions of standing facilities should be separated from 
steering short-term interest rates, making sure that stabilization is at the discretion of the 
central bank (see Bindseil 2004, p.103-108). 
 
2.2.1. USA 
In the US, there is only a borrowing facility, which is called “discount window”. Prior to 
2003, this term was used to summarize two lending programs called “adjustment credit” and 
the somewhat less important “extended credit”. Except for their importance, these facilities 
differed with respect to their credit period, with the first program addressing short-term and 
the latter longer-term liquidity needs. Yet both of them were set below the effective federal 
funds rate, which was problematic because it created arbitrage-opportunities that had to be 
prevented by the Fed. Therefore, there was a major revision of the discount window lending 
programs in 2003. As a result, the two programs had been replaced by “primary credit”, 
“secondary credit” and “seasonal credit” Lombard-type lending programs. Primary credit, 
representing the Fed’s main discount window program, is generally available to sound 
depository institutions on a short-term basis and is usually set about 1 percent above the 
federal funds target rate, although the spread might vary depending on the specific 
circumstances (Chart 6). There might also be situations in which primary credit is extended 
for periods of up to a few weeks. Secondary credit, on the contrary, is granted to depository 
institutions that are less financially sound and therefore not eligible to obtain primary credit. It 
is typically set 50 basis points above the primary credit rate. Finally, seasonal credit, which is 
based on market interest rates, is intended to provide funding for small depository institutions 
that face seasonal liquidity fluctuations.  Regardless of the program, institutions that want to 
borrow through discount window programs have to be subject to reserve requirements. 
Eligible collateral, which is required for every discount window program, ranges from US 
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Treasury securities over asset-backed securities to consumer loans. Therefore, compared to 
the rather narrow list of collateral accepted by the Fed in its repurchase agreements, 
depository institutions have much more to choose from (see Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2005, p. 45-50; The Federal Reserve Bank Discount Window & 
Payment System Risk Website).   
 
2.2.2. Japan 
Also the BoJ did not install a deposit facility and therefore relies exclusively on a (Lombard-
type) borrowing facility, the so called “Complementary Lending Facility”, which is set above 
the overnight call rate. Yet in contrast to the US, the Japanese central bank does not offer 
several lending programs but only one. In principle, all counterparties that maintain accounts 
at the BoJ are eligible for obtaining funds through this borrowing facility. In practice, 
however, depository institutions are more likely to make use of it because securities 
companies and other eligible institutions must pay a higher tax on borrowed funds from this 
facility. Like the comparable facility in the US, the Complementary Lending Facility aims at 
providing merely short-term funding. More specifically, the maturity of the BoJ’s borrowing 
facility is usually overnight, with the rule that this facility can only be used on up to five 
business days in each maintenance period (1 month). The interest rate applicable to such loans 
is the “basic loan rate” (Chart 7). But other than primary or secondary credit, which are set at 
a fixed rate above the federal funds target rate, the spread between the Complementary 
Lending Facility and the overnight call rate might be altered at every Monetary Policy 
Meeting of the Policy Board. Then again, there are many similarities concerning the range of 
eligible collateral. Both, the Fed and the BoJ, accept not only government or government-
guaranteed securities but also a broad variety of corporate bonds and private debt (see BIS 
2001, p. 30 and 33; Olivei 2002, p. 40).  
 
2.3. Reserve Requirements 
The last monetary policy instrument to be discussed is the reserve requirement. Despite the 
incapacity to fulfill its initial purpose, namely ensuring banks’ individual liquidity against 
bank runs, and continually changing justifications for its existence during the 20th century, 
reserve requirements nevertheless remain an essential monetary policy instrument. Today, this 
instrument is considered to provide an important averaging facility, such that transitory 
liquidity-shocks do not cause fluctuations in short-term interest rates. Furthermore, reserve 
requirements might be viewed as a precondition for the effectiveness of open market 
 14 
operations since they create a demand for central bank money, which comes as follows: When 
applying reserve requirements, commercial banks are obliged to hold a certain fraction of 
customer deposits at their accounts at the central bank. Since this liquidity is no longer in the 
banking system, there is a so called “structural liquidity shortage” that makes commercial 
banks willing to engage in open market operations with the central bank in order to 
counterbalance this “loss” of liquidity (see Bindseil 2004, p. 179-180 and Keijser 2006, p.54). 
 
2.3.1. USA 
Until the end of the Second World War, the Federal Reserve was the only major central bank 
that used reserve requirements as a monetary policy tool, although, as mentioned above, its 
legimitation was somewhat different than today.  
Reserve requirement ratios are adjusted annually in order to keep up with the growth of the 
banking system (reserve requirement rations mentioned below were in force in 2004).  When 
applying reserve requirement ratios, the Fed takes into account the different sizes of 
institutions. Therefore, if a depository institution has less than $6.6 million on its customers’ 
transaction accounts (transactions accounts include checking and other accounts, from which 
payments can be made), it does not face any reserve requirements. For amounts ranging 
between $6.6 million and $45.4 million, the institution has to deposit 3 percent of the amount. 
Larger banks with more than $45.4 million on their customers’ transaction accounts face 
reserve requirements of $ 1 164 000 plus 10 percent of the amount exceeding $45.4 million. 
Unlike many other central banks, the Fed also accepts vault cash for the fulfillment. In recent 
years, however, there is an obvious downward trend of (absolute) required reserve balances 
held at the Fed (Chart 8). Except for two cuts in reserve requirement ratios in 1990 and 1992, 
this is primarily the result of the introduction of so called “retail sweep programs” that allow 
banks to transfer funds from reserveable transaction accounts to non-reserveable accounts, 
mostly money market deposit accounts (see Bindseil 2004, p.180; Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2005, p. 41-42; The Federal Reserve Board 1997, p. 869-870). 
 
2.3.2. Japan 
In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, a good deal of the major central banks introduced reserve 
requirements as a monetary policy tool. Likewise, the BoJ discovered this instrument in 1959. 
As in the US, the Japanese central bank requires only depository institutions to hold reserve 
balances on their BoJ accounts, although also the other counterparties usually maintain 
current account deposits at the BoJ on a voluntary basis. In contrast to the Fed, however, the 
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BoJ imposes reserve requirements on a broad range of deposits, including time deposits and 
foreign currency deposits and does not accept vault cash for meeting these requirements. The 
specific reserve requirement depends on the amount, the type of deposit as well as the 
currency and ranges from 0.05 to 1.3 percent (as of 2000), which has to be fulfilled over the 
maintenance period (1 month). Another difference is the fact that the downward trend of 
(absolute) required reserve balances is not present in Japan, which might be the consequence 
of increasing required reserve rates (Chart 9) (see BIS 2001, p. 37; Bindseil 2004, p. 182; 
Bank of Japan 2004a, p. 53). 
 
 
3. The Macroeconomic and Financial Conditions prior to the Introduction of 
Quantitative Easing 
 
Both countries have in common that they experienced a period of substantial economic 
growth prior to the introduction of QE, which was followed by a severe recession. This, in 
turn, made it necessary to expand the traditional toolkit of monetary policy instruments to 
include also “unconventional” measures. In what follows, these macroeconomic, financial and 
also political developments that paved the way for QE are examined. Again, the starting point 
is the US, preceding the examination of the Japanese experience between 1980 and 2000. 
 
3.1. USA 
The recovery of the American economy that started in November 2001 following the 
economic slowdown after the dot-com bubble burst was to a large extend fueled by a rather 
steep increase in house prices all across the country (Chart 10): From 1997 (Q1) to 2007 (Q2), 
where the housing market reached its cyclical peak, the “House Price Index (HPI)”, which is 
estimated by the “Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO)”, nearly doubled 
(+96.4%).  
Accordingly, also new housing starts (2005: 2 068 000, see U.S. Census Bureau) and sales of 
existing homes (2005: 7 076 000, see National Association of Realtors 2008) reached record 
highs. Having in mind that historically, house prices increased on average with the same rate 
as the overall inflation and that US population growth amounted to about 10 percent in the 
last decade, the dramatic price-increases on the real estate market seem to be nothing but 
speculative.  The Fed, which lowered the federal funds target rate to 1 percent in June 2003, 
set the basis for this asset price bubble since many homebuyers took advantage of adjustable 
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mortgage rates that have a low starting rate but can be adjusted after a lock-in period of 
usually three years. Of course the developments on the housing market had massive impacts 
on the overall economy: First, there was a direct effect through the employment of workers in 
construction as well as of employees in construction related industries (real estate, mortgage 
banking sector, etc.). Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, the increase in housing wealth 
was a major driving force for consumption expenditures since home owners took advantage of 
increasing real estate prices by borrowing against their homes, turning the savings rate 
negative. As a result, the consumption share of GDP rose from 68.7 percent in 2000 to 70.3 
percent in 2006 (Q3). Investment, on the contrary, exhibited a somewhat lower growth rate, 
for the following reasons: First, the US-economy sustained a relatively high level of 
investment as a result of the dot-com bubble and secondly, the housing market pulled away 
resources from non-residential investment. GDP itself stopped its downward trend it had 
begun after the burst of the preceding bubble and reached a cyclical high in the 4th quarter of 
2003 (+7.5%). Not surprisingly, the first years of the 21st century were also a period 
exhibiting a downward trend in the unemployment rate (Chart 11). 
Many homebuyers that bought a house in recent years did so without adequate or even any 
funding. This balancing act did work out during the housing boom when house prices were 
rising and personal income was sufficient to cover the relatively low mortgage rates. But 
when the Fed started raising the federal funds target rate in June 2004, the burst of the bubble 
was merely a matter of time. It comes as no surprise that house prices nevertheless increased 
until 2007. The reason for this is the already mentioned lock-in period. Since a good deal of 
adjustable mortgages had been granted in 2003 and 2004, many home owners faced, 
depending on the type of mortgage, a considerable increase in their mortgage payment around 
2006 and 2007. Home owners, who made no down payment and devoted a substantial fraction 
of their income to meet their mortgage payments already before the lock-in period had ended, 
faced severe difficulties. This lead to a dramatic increase in foreclosure rates and a reversion 
of the prevailing upward trend in house prices (Chart 10). The implications are 
straightforward: Consumption based on increasing house prices was not possible any more, 
which lead to a sharp decline of GDP growth and an equally sharp increase in unemployment 
(Chart 11) (see Baker 2006, p. 1-16 and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 11/30/07). 
Against the background of the collapse of two major investment banks (i.e. Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers) and other financial institutions having severe liquidity problems as well as 
a serious recession that many observers, whether this is correct or not, lead to comparisons 
with the Great Depression of the 1930s, the Bush and the Obama administration, respectively, 
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introduced several massive financial and economic stimulus packages. A discussion of these 
programs is beyond the scope of this diploma thesis. Therefore, they are just briefly 
mentioned. The “Economic Stimulus Act of 2008”, passed in February 2008, basically 
provided tax rebates to low- and middle-income taxpayers that amounted to $168 billion in 
total. The second and by far bigger stimulus package (“American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009”) included $787 billion in tax cuts and new spending programs. To help restoring 
the smooth functioning of bank lending, the “Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 
2008” allowed the US Treasury to buy distressed assets from financial institutions (which was 
abandoned later)  and to provide them with additional funding if necessary. This program, 
commonly referred to as financial bailout, amounted to up to $700 billion (see FoxNews.com 
02/07/08;  U.S. House of Representatives 2009; The Coloradoan 04/16/09; Reuters 11/12/08). 
 
3.2. Japan 
In the decades after the Second World War, the Japanese economy experienced a period of 
high GDP growth rates that culminated in the 1980, accompanied by an excessive boom in 
both the real estate and the stock market: Between 1985 and 1991, some segments of the real 
estate market rose by as much as 268 percent (Chart 12) and therefore much more than in the 
US. The Nikkei 225, Japan’s major stock market index, increased by 470 percent between 
1980 and 1989. 
Like in the US, monetary policy played a crucial role in fueling these asset price bubbles. 
Between 1985 and 1987, the Bank of Japan gradually lowered the official discount rate from 
5 to 2.5 percent and left it there for two years, despite soaring asset prices. Equally important, 
however, was the liberalization of the financial sector in the second half of the 1980s, 
whereby large corporations gained access to national and international financial markets for 
acquiring funding. As a consequence, banks – until then the primary source for liquidity 
seeking corporations – lost a substantial part of their traditional client base. To compensate for 
these losses, financial institutions embraced smaller firms with limited access to capital 
markets and the property sector. This spurred demand for and prices of commercial as well as 
residential property, having the effect that property owning firms were able to increase 
borrowing against collateral, thereby causing additional demand for commercial real estate. 
Therefore, firms were the driving force behind the Japanese real estate bubble that was hence 
most excessive in commercial property. In the US, on the other hand, the recent housing 
bubble originated in the private housing market and was to a large extend fueled by non-
commercial demand. When looking at the driving forces of GDP growth in the 1980s, one can 
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see that this somewhat reversed pattern also holds true for the development of consumption 
and investment: Although both expanded rapidly in this decade, the latter component of GDP 
grew at a considerably faster pace. The reason for this was, as already mentioned, easier 
access to capital markets or bank loans, respectively, and, on the other hand, a reluctance of 
private home owners to borrow against their house to finance consumption expenditures. 
Hence it comes as no surprise that also the overall GDP expanded at a remarkable pace during 
the late 1980s: Between 1985 and 1990, the Japanese economy grew on average by 4.8 
percent per year. Correspondingly, unemployment was not much of a problem in the 1980s 
(average: 2.5 percent, Chart 13). 
However, like every other asset price bubble, Japan’s stock market and real estate bubble had 
to burst sooner or later, which happened at the end of 1989 with the Nikkei 225 stock market 
index reaching its all time high of nearly 40 000 points. Despite the burst of the stock market 
bubble, the BoJ started raising the discount rate to 6 percent in August 1990, apparently 
because real estate prices kept rising for about another year and concerns about inflationary 
pressure (1989 inflation: 2.3 percent) were present. Only after the real estate market begun to 
collapse, the BoJ started easing its monetary policy stance. Between June 1991 and September 
1995, the official discount rate was lowered to 0.5 percent. But due to upcoming deflation, 
real interest rate changes were less pronounced than changes in nominal interest rates, thereby 
reducing the stimulative effect of nominal interest rate reductions. In 1999, after several years 
of recession and persistent deflation or very low inflation, the BoJ, by lowering its key policy 
rate (overnight call rate) to virtually zero, introduced a policy referred to as “zero interest rate 
policy (ZIRP)”. This is a striking contrast to the Fed’s policy in the current crisis, since it took 
the American central bank merely 16 months to reduce interest rates from their peak to near 
zero. It is worth mentioning that during the whole 1990s, the unemployment rate stayed below 
5 percent and also GDP growth, though turning negative in some quarters, was merely 
stagnating at worst, which compares quite favorably to the current US macroeconomic 
performance. Thus, the different reactions of monetary policy in Japan and the US in terms of 
the key target rates are to some extend understandable. The comparably mild macroeconomic 
performance in Japan is partly the result of the 10 massive fiscal stimulus packages initiated 
in this particular decade, which, in total, exceeded 100 trillion yen (more than $1 trillion, with 
USD/JPY exchange rate as of 04/27/09) and included tax cuts as well as large scale public 
work programs. It is argued, however, that the main guiding criteria for financing construction 
projects was to ensure the political support of the construction industry, rather than the 
effectiveness or usefulness of the specific projects. This is seen as one of the main reasons 
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why these huge stimulus packages were not able to shift the economy back on a solid growth 
path, except for a temporary recovery phase between 1994 and 1996, but resulted merely in a 
drastically increasing debt-to-GDP ratio: While this value amounted to only 46.8 in 1990, 
government debt reached as much as 106.2 percent of GDP only ten years later (2000). In 
addition to these stimulus packages, the Japanese government was also forced to pass several 
financial bailout packages to stabilize the banking system through recapitalizing 
undercapitalized but principally sound banks and the construction of a bridge bank facility to 
continue the operations of failed institutions. These measures became necessary as many 
banks suffered from “bad loans” since the collateral (i.e. real estate) upon which the loans had 
been granted, lost dramatically in value (see IMF 1998, p. 107-120; Powell 2002, p. 35-39; 
Makin 2008, p. 2-3 and OECD 2009). 
 
 
4. Preparing the Path for Quantitative Easing: The Ineffectiveness of “Conventional” 
Monetary Policy 
 
The economic and financial conditions that prevailed in Japan during the 1990s and in the US 
since 2007 affected the respective economies in quite different ways. It turned out, however, 
that in both countries “traditional” monetary policy reached its limits. Therefore, for 
addressing the particular problems, monetary policy had to break fresh ground. The specific 
developments, which made this shift necessary, are the main subject of the next two sections. 
The final section of this paragraph then examines on theoretical grounds possible 
“unconventional” measures at the disposal of the central bank that move beyond the 
traditional monetary policy toolkit. One of these is, in fact, Quantitative Easing. 
 
4.1. USA 
Rapidly falling house prices in the US had also indirect effects on the economy through the 
banking system, primarily because of a new trend that emerged in the financial sector: In the 
past, banks that granted mortgages kept them on their books. Yet in recent years, more and 
more banks switched to selling the mortgages they granted to other financial institutions. 
They did so by creating structured products, which consist of a portfolio of not only 
mortgages but also loans or credit card receivables. These products that are often called 
“collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)” or “collateralized loan obligations (CLOs)”, 
depending on the concrete composition of their portfolios, are then sliced into different 
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tranches with the first tranche (“super senior”) being the first one to be paid out by the issuer 
and thus enjoying the highest credit rating. An essential drawback that comes along with such 
a procedure is the fact that the transfer of the credit risk distances the borrower from the 
lender. Usually, banks that granted a loan also had to bear the default risk. Therefore they had 
an incentive to carefully examine the prospective borrower and to deny credit if necessary. 
With creating structured products, however, the initial credit grantor transfers the credit risk to 
other financial institutions. Thus, its incentive to grant loans or mortgages only to borrowers 
that are trustworthy, declines dramatically. When house prices started falling and more and 
more home owners failed to meet their mortgage payments, structured products lost 
dramatically in value and their respective markets became more or less illiquid. As a 
consequence, so called “precautionary hoarding” took place: Banks hoarded large amounts of 
liquidity and refrained from lending in the interbank market because first, their own exposure 
to losses due to structured products and therefore their own liquidity needs were far from 
certain and secondly, as banks were aware of the fact that their competitors had the same 
problems, they knew that obtaining funds in the interbank market at reasonable prices when 
needed was hardly possible and thirdly, due to counterparty credit risk concerns, they feared 
that loans granted to other banks might default because of serious liquidity problems. Hence it 
should come as no surprise that the spread between the 3 months LIBOR, which is a reference 
rate based on the interest rates at which banks borrow unsecured funds for three months from 
each other, and the effective federal funds rate, widened considerably as banks were hardly 
willing to grant uncollateralized credit for a longer period than overnight (Chart 14). 
Furthermore, the Fed faced severe difficulties in keeping the demand for and the supply of 
reserves in equilibrium, which manifested itself in above-average deviations of the effective 
federal funds rate from its target (Chart 15). 
These developments had, of course, also implications for private persons and companies, 
regardless of the particular creditworthiness: Even those banks, that received a good deal of 
the government aid granted in the course of the financial turmoil, made or refinanced 23 
percent fewer new loans in February 2009 than in October 2008, which further exacerbated 
the economic downturn (see Brunnermeier 2008, p. 2-27 and The Wall Street Journal 
04/2009).  
Against this background, the American central bank started lowering its target rate pretty soon 
after it became obvious that the severe problems within the financial sector started affecting 
the real economy: On December 16, 2008, the Fed set the target rate as a corridor ranging 
from 0 to 0.25 percent, thereby ending a series of more or less drastic reductions of its 
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operational target. With inflation averaging at 3.8 percent in 2008, this policy step was not 
primarily set to keep the price level from declining. Instead, the main motivation behind this 
decision was restoring the smooth functioning of interbank markets and of bank lending to 
businesses as well as to consumers, or, simply put, to end the “credit crunch”.  
It should be noted, however, that money market frictions accounted only for a part of the 
credit crunch. Rather, apart from simple deterioration of debtors’ financial positions, banks’ 
poor lending activities stemmed from the decline in their capital-to-asset ratios: With 
declining asset prices, the banks also had to reduce the asset side (i.e. loans) to keep the ratio 
more or less at the level they are required to maintain for regulatory reasons. They did so by 
raising rates, tightening credit standards or by simply refusing to roll over expiring loans. 
How severe the effects on the lending activity were can be shown by the following example: 
In order to keep the capital-to-asset ratio at, say, 10 percent, a bank has to reduce its assets by 
$10 for every $1 decline in capital, which is called “deleveraging”. Therefore it should come 
as no surprise that in July 2008, according to the “Federal Reserve Board Senior Loan Officer 
Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices”, 65 percent of the banks tightened their lending 
standards for small firms, which is a record high. This can also be seen when looking at 
various spreads: The spread between the bank’s own cost of funding and the rate charged to 
small firms had been raised by about 80 percent of US banks (July 2008). And external 
financing was not much of an option either because also the spread between investment grade 
corporate bond yields and the effective federal funds rate widened considerably (Chart 16). 
Since consumption accounts for a relatively large share of GDP in the US, it is worth noting 
that the same pattern holds true for the spread between the 30-year mortgage rate and the 
effective federal funds rate, as seen in Chart 17 (see Rosengren 2008, p. 1-12 and 
Bernanke/Lown 1991, p. 221-224). 
So with an US economy facing a credit crunch that is brought about by malfunctions of 
interbank markets as well as banks’ reluctance in granting or extending new loans (either 
because of weak positions of potential borrowers or because of banks´ declining capital 
cover), reductions of the target rate were apparently not enough to restore confidence in 
interbank markets and to encourage banks to increase their lending activities to both 
businesses and consumers. 
 
4.2. Japan 
Although the economic and financial developments in the USA and Japan after the burst of 
the two bubbles share some commonalities like severe difficulties of major financial 
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institutions and the financial system as a whole or worrisome output tendencies, there remain 
some important differences: Whereas the most striking problem in Japan during the 1990s 
was deflation, the most severe problems of the USA in the current crisis are wide credit 
spreads and dysfunctional interbank markets.  Therefore one of the main goals of monetary 
policy in Japan was fighting deflationary tendencies. This was also the main motivation 
behind the introduction of the ZIRP (in fact, the lowest level of the uncollateralized overnight 
call rate that has been reached was 0.02 percent) in February 1999, which was intended to 
“counter the possibility of mounting deflationary pressure and prevent further deterioration in 
economic conditions” (Bank of Japan 2000) by providing “more ample funds and encourage 
the uncollateralized call rate to move as low as possible” (Bank of Japan 1999). However, 
after some early and ex post misleading signs of economic recovery and although deflation 
was still present, the ZIRP was abolished in August 2000 by raising the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate to 0.25 percent. Two months later, the Japanese economy was falling into 
recession and deflation got much worse (see Ito 2005, p. 107-115). 
 
4.3. The Way Out: Quantitative Easing and Other “Unconventional” Measures 
So both central banks were in the uncomfortable situation of having lowered their key target 
rates (nearly) as low as possible without seeing any signs of achieving the effects that were 
the initial motivation behind this step. It seems as if monetary policy has exhausted all 
potential options at its disposal and became more or less ineffective because both economies 
were seemingly stuck in a so called “liquidity trap”. This is a situation in which the nominal 
short-term interest rate is zero or near zero and, as a consequence, further monetary expansion 
has not the desired effects since the usual transmission mechanisms do not work properly: 
When the nominal short-term interest rate is (near) zero, financial institutions are indifferent 
between holding zero interest rate assets (currency) and holding near-zero interest rate assets 
(short-term bonds) on their balance sheet. Hence banks have no incentive to increase their 
lending activities. This view, however, is somewhat incomplete, since it does not take into 
account that first, in a deflationary environment, real short-term interest rates are still positive 
and that secondly, the yields of assets differ with respect to their maturity, i.e. the yield curve 
is not flat but upward sloping (Chart 18). Therefore, the central bank could either focus on 
lowering real short-term interest rates by affecting private sector inflation expectations, 
thereby facing credibility problems, or it could focus on lowering long-term interest rates. 
Having in mind that long-term interest rates are by far more important for investment and 
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consumption decisions, central banks still have a promising chance of stimulating output and 
ending deflation (in the case of Japan) (see Orphanides 2003, p. 16-19; Spiegel 2001). 
 
4.3.1. Shaping Expectations 
The central banks can flatten the yield curve by applying “unconventional” monetary policy 
measures. The one that requires the smallest, if any, amount of open market operations works 
via affecting expectations: Since the return on long-term financial assets depends crucially on 
the level of short-term interest rates that are expected to prevail in the future, the central bank 
can lower long-term interest rates by credibly assuring that it will keep short-term interest 
rates near zero even after certain macroeconomic variables like inflation have reached a level 
that would, under normal circumstances, imply a short-term interest rate target that lies above 
zero. Therefore, if the central bank is successful in convincing market participants that it will 
keep short-term interest rates longer at the zero bound than it would normally do, they will 
adjust their expectations concerning future short-term interest rates, which exerts downward 
pressure on long-term interest rates. This mechanism is referred to as the “policy duration 
effect” (see Bernanke/Reinhart 2004, p. 85; Ugai 2006, p. 8-9). 
 
4.3.2. Changing the Composition of the Balance Sheet 
 
Equation 1 
 
      (see Clouse et al. 2003) 
 
Another possibility to lower interest rates at the long end of the maturity range would involve 
changes in the composition of the central bank’s balance sheet, but without affecting its 
overall size. Two theories help explaining the link between this measure and long-term 
interest rates: Under the assumption that long-term and short-term bonds are imperfect 
substitutes because risk-averse investors prefer short-term assets, which are generally less 
risky, a distinct decline in the relative supply of long-term assets can influence, that is to say 
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lower, the risk premium component of the long-term bond rate (equation 1). This mechanism 
is called the “portfolio balance channel”. Consequently, since central banks are important 
participants in the securities markets and hence have the ability to significantly influence 
relative demand, a shift in their securities holdings from short-term to long-term government 
debt is quite likely to flatten the yield curve. But by altering the composition of its balance 
sheet, the central bank could exert pressure on long-term interest rates also through the 
“signaling channel”. In contrast to the just described portfolio balance channel, however, this 
theory assumes investors to be risk neutral, which implies perfect substitutability of short-
term and long-term assets, i.e. a risk premium of zero. Under this assumption, long-term bond 
yields equal the expected short-term yields that are expected to prevail in the future (first part 
of equation 1), thereby making investors willing to hold both asset classes. Now if the central 
bank announces that it is buying more long-term relative to short-term bonds, the monetary 
authority is “signaling” that it has a vital interest in rather low short-term interest rates in the 
future, since otherwise it would incur capital losses on its stock of long-term bonds. 
Therefore, market participant expect the future short-term interest rates to be lower than 
originally perceived, which, according to equation 1 (under the assumption that the risk 
premium is zero), leads to lower long-term interest rates. This effect might be present even if 
the central bank announced that it will maintain short-term interest rates of (near) zero 
because now it has something at stake (see Bernanke/Reinhart 2004, p. 86-87; Clouse et al. 
2003, p. 25-26).  
 
4.3.3. Increasing the Size of the Balance Sheet: Quantitative Easing 
While a main characteristic of the just discussed policy option is a stable balance sheet in 
terms of the total amount, the most striking characteristic of the last policy option to be 
discussed here is, in fact, an increase in the overall size of the balance sheet. The central bank 
can achieve this by buying long-term securities, thereby affecting long-term interest rates 
directly. This is basically the portfolio balance channel. Nevertheless, even the purchase of 
short-term assets does not leave the long end of the yield curve unaffected since money is an 
imperfect substitute for (long-term) financial assets, making investors unwilling to hold cash 
instead of interest bearing (long-term) assets, which is known as the “portfolio rebalancing 
effect”. Apart from that, the term structure of interest rates might again be flattened through 
the expectations channel as well because a substantial expansion of the central bank’s balance 
sheet could increase the credibility of the commitment of keeping short-term interest rates 
near zero for quite a while (signaling channel). 
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This last policy option, which is at the discretion of the central bank, is commonly referred to 
as active “quantitative easing (QE)”. But although this specific form of QE might be the most 
important one, passive QE that aims at providing liquidity to eligible financial institutions at 
their request in order to increase the overall liquidity in the financial system, also fulfills an 
important function in overcoming the difficulties discussed above.  
When the BoJ introduced QE in March 2001, it was the first central bank worldwide to do so, 
owed to the fact that Japan was also the only industrialized economy that experienced a long-
lasting deflation. As the Fed engaged in (active) QE for the first time in March 2009 
(purchases of long-term government debt to influence long-term interest rates), many 
observers made the somewhat misleading suggestion that both BoJ-type and Fed-type QE are 
roughly the same. However, as the Fed Chairman Bernanke clarified in a speech in January 
2009, this is not the case. Until March 2001, the BoJ, like all other major central banks, 
considered short-term interest rates as its main policy target. Yet following the introduction of 
QE, the Japanese central bank abandoned the interest rate target and focused exclusively on 
targeting reserves held by financial institutions on their accounts at the BoJ. The specific form 
of transactions conducted under QE, was secondary at best. This is a striking contrast to the 
Fed´s current QE-policy. For the American central bank, the federal funds rate is still the main 
target. Instead, the Fed “focuses on the mix of loans and securities that it holds and on how 
this composition of assets affects credit conditions for households and businesses” (see 
Bernanke 2009a). Furthermore, the Fed relies on a threefold approach, containing active and 
passive QE as well as liquidity provision directly to borrowers and investors in stressed credit 
markets, whereas the BoJ used principally only active QE. That is why Bernanke described 
the Fed’s implementation of QE as “Credit Easing (CE)”, thereby making a clear distinction 
from Japan’s “pure” QE regime. In what follows now, these two concepts of QE will be 
discussed and compared in detail (see Ito 2005, p. 107-116; Bernanke 2009a; Bernanke/ 
Reinhart 2004, p. 85-88). 
 
 
5. Quantitative Easing in Practice: Commonalities and Differences of Two 
“Unconventional” Monetary Policy Approaches 
 
In this paragraph, which represents the main part of this diploma thesis, the respective QE 
policies in Japan between 2001 and 2006 and in the US since 2007 are examined. After 
stating the general outlines and purposes of QE in the two countries under consideration, 
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which directly follows from the macroeconomic and financial problems identified above, the 
concrete measures attributable to active and passive QE as wells to “direct lending to 
borrowers and investors” (only for the USA) are analyzed. However, a comprehensive 
assessment of QE is not complete without an evaluation of the effects on macroeconomic and 
financial variables. Therefore the last subsection aims to identify the impact of QE.  
 
5.1. Introduction of QE 
 
5.1.1. Japan 
At the end of 2000, after the termination of the ZIRP, with inflation still being clearly 
negative and economic growth, after showing some promising signs in spring, deteriorating 
even more, the overall picture of the Japanese economy did not look very favorable. As a 
consequence, on February 28, 2001, the policy board of the BoJ lowered the uncollateralized 
overnight call rate and the discount rate to 0.10 and 0.25 percent, respectively. The economy, 
however, did not respond to these interest rate cuts as it had been desired. Against this 
background, the BoJ opted for a radical policy change: In the monetary policy meeting 
(MPM) of March 19, 2001, the Japanese central bank decided to switch to QE, a policy 
strategy unknown at that time. In the view of the policy board, “the economic conditions 
warrant monetary easing as drastic as is unlikely to be taken under ordinary circumstances” 
(see minutes of the MPM on 03/19/2001).  
The new strategy basically consisted of three pillars: The most distinctive feature of QE was 
the shift from the short-term interest rate to current account balances (CABs) at the BoJ – the 
sum of required and excess reserves – as the main operating target. Secondly, the policy board 
stated that QE should “continue to be in place until the consumer price index (excluding 
perishables, on a nationwide statistic) registers stably at zero percent or an increase year on 
year” (see minutes of the MPM on 03/19/2001), which is an explicit exit condition based on 
inflation. Thirdly, the BoJ announced that it will increase its purchases of long-term JGBs 
from at that time 400 billion yen per month, if the central bank deems it necessary. 
Concerning the first pillar of QE, the BoJ decided to set the target for CABs at 5 trillion yen, 
which exceeded required reserves by about 1 trillion yen. In subsequent years, the target had 
been raised several times, beginning in August 2001 (6 trillion yen). In January 2004, the 
target (corridor) had been set between 30 and 35 trillion yen, thereby ending the cycle of 
consecutive CAB target increases (Chart 19). By switching to CABs as the main policy target, 
the BoJ implicitly determined the uncollateralized overnight call rate as well, which comes as 
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follows: For all assets, there exists a more or less stable relationship between the price and the 
quantity demanded. This is also true for excess reserves held at the BoJ. If the price of holding 
excess reserves, i.e. the short-term interest rate as a measure of opportunity costs, increases, 
counterparties are less willing to pile up reserves at their BoJ-accounts. On the contrary, if the 
BoJ injects liquidity into the banking system in the form of increased CABs, the price of 
CABs (i.e. the interest rate) has to decrease. And since the uncollateralized overnight call rate 
was at 0.10 percent even before the introduction of QE, it should come as no surprise that the 
short-term interest rate declined to virtually zero shortly after the MPM of March 19, 2001. 
This is also a prerequisite for achieving the CAB target since CABs do not bear interest. 
Hence, under normal circumstances with short-term interest rates significantly different from 
zero, banks would face opportunity costs when holding funds at the BoJ in excess of their 
reserve requirements which makes them reluctant to do so. It should be noted, however that at 
the beginning of the QE policy and also previously during the ZIRP, non-bank financial 
institutions, which are not required to hold reserves at the BoJ, absorbed the increases in 
CABs, whereas commercial banks were not willing to hold significant amounts of reserves in 
excess of their reserve requirements. Yet with the BoJ consecutively raising the CAB target, 
also commercial banks became more willing to accumulate excess reserves (see Bank of 
Japan 2002, p. 2; Shirakawa 2001, p. 3; Ito 2005, p. 115-116; Maeda et al. 2005, p. 4 and 9). 
The second feature of QE in Japan – an easily quantifiable exit strategy based on inflation – is 
a clear improvement compared to the ZIRP. In 1999, the policy board aimed at maintaining 
“the current decisive easy stance of monetary policy (note: ZIRP), firmly underpinning 
economic activity until deflationary concerns were dispelled” (see minutes of the MPM on 
04/19/1999). As already noted, the BoJ decided to keep QE in force until “the consumer price 
index (excluding perishables, on a nationwide statistic) registers stably at zero percent or an 
increase year on year” (see minutes of the MPM on 03/19/2001). This statement was specified 
in the MPM of October 10, 2003: “It requires not only that the most recently published core 
CPI should register a zero percent or above, but also that such tendency should be confirmed 
over a few months” and “the Bank needs to be convinced that the prospective core CPI will 
not be expected to register below a zero percent”. Hence, in order to abandon QE, past 
inflation had to be positive not only for a month or a quarter but for a somewhat longer period 
of time, together with a positive inflation forecast for the months ahead. But even in the 
presence of sustained and stable inflation, the BoJ left the backdoor open for continuing QE 
by stating that “the Bank will judge it appropriate to continue with quantitative easing even if 
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these two conditions are fulfilled“ (see minutes of the MPM on 04/19/1999, 03/19/2001 and 
10/10/2003). 
 
5.1.2. USA 
In August 2007, when the subprime crisis started to accelerate and the exposure of financial 
institutions to the same became more and more apparent, also the above mentioned 
uncertainties regarding own funding needs as well as counterparty credit risk concerns 
intensified. As a result, banks were reluctant to engage in the interbank market as a credit 
grantor for maturities longer than overnight. Financial institutions in demand of funding, on 
the other hand, were forced to bid aggressively in the federal funds market. These two 
markets, in turn, experienced volatility rates that have not been seen for many years: While 
the spread between the 3 month LIBOR and the effective federal funds rate widened 
considerably (Chart 14 above), the Desk faced severe difficulties in maintaining the effective 
federal funds rate at its target (Chart 15 above). Yet in the following months, at least the 
federal funds market, except for the turn of the year, stabilized for the most part. In September 
of the following year, however, after the failure of Lehman Brothers – a major US-based 
investment bank – both markets exhibited extreme volatility and soaring spreads (in the case 
of LIBOR-effective federal funds rate).  
While the Fed was struggling to stabilize financial markets, it was also concerned about 
inflationary pressures stemming from soaring energy and commodity prices. That is a striking 
contrast to the problems the BoJ faced in early 2001, prior to the introduction of QE: Its main 
objective was, in fact, fighting deflation, whereas, at least compared to the current US 
experience, strains in interbank markets were not much of a problem. Thus it appears that 
both QE approaches have entirely different aims in order to reflect these just mentioned 
“differences in financial and economic conditions between the two episodes” (Bernanke 
2009a), which is also reflected in their respective arrangements: While the BoJ primarily 
relied upon outright purchases of government securities, the Fed, as noted above, follows a 
threefold approach consisting of active QE, passive QE and liquidity provision directly to 
borrowers and investors in stressed credit markets, whereat it attaches great importance to the 
latter two pillars: So far it has introduced as much as 8 new instruments and modified 2 of its 
existing facilities to provide the market with much needed liquidity by means of different 
types of credit or with Treasury securities, which, in turn, can be used to obtain funds in the 
market. These two pillars have in common that they extend both the range of eligible 
counterparties and of eligible collateral, thereby offering a much larger set of market 
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participants an affordable way to obtain liquidity. Thus, by dealing directly with market 
participants and not only with a limited number of primary dealers that act as intermediaries, 
the Fed undertook to some extend the task of interbank markets. It should be noted, though, 
that a well-defined attribution of the newly introduced measures to one of the three categories 
of the American QE approach is not always possible. That is, some instruments contain 
elements that could justify declaring them as “passive” or “active”, while at the same time 
embodying characteristics of direct liquidity provision to borrowers in credit markets.  
What is more, the Fed never changed its operational target from the overnight interest rate to 
reserves of depository institutions, as did the Japanese central bank. As Bernanke puts it, “the 
stance of the Fed policy in the current regime – in contrast to a QE regime – is not easily 
summarized by a single number, such as the quantity of excess reserves […]” (Bernanke 
2009a).  
Another striking contrast to the Japanese QE approach is the fact that there was no explicit 
starting date. Instead, the Fed started with some gradual changes into the direction of QE, 
before introducing completely new facilities: In August 2007, the FOMC decided to lower the 
spread between the federal funds rate target and the primary credit rate to 50 basis points by 
reducing the latter, which can be seen as a measure to promote passive QE. A further step into 
this direction was made in December 2007, when the American central bank implemented the 
“Term Auction Facility (TAF)”. Active QE, on the other hand, had been introduced as late as 
November 2008: On the 25th, the Fed announced plans to purchase up to $100 billion in 
government-sponsored enterprise (GSE) debt as well as up to $500 billion in mortgage-
backed securities (MBS). The purchase of US Treasury securities had not been introduced 
before March 2009 (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2008, p. 1-2 and 27; Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York 2009a, p. 1-3; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009a 
and Bernanke 2009a). 
And also with respect to the exit strategy, the Fed follows a somewhat different approach than 
its Japanese counterpart: Whereas the BoJ’s exit from QE is, as noted above, primarily based 
on past and expected future inflation, the Fed, on the contrary, did not explicitly name 
macroeconomic or financial variables whose performance is decisive for the exit of QE or 
rather for the abolishment of the particular instruments subsumed under the term QE. In most 
cases, while introducing the new instruments, the Fed at the same time stated an explicit date 
until which the particular facilities should remain in force or at least emphasized the temporal 
nature of the concerned measures. The Fed might, however, postpone the exit if conditions in 
financial markets warrant it, which it did several times so far. Currently the AMLF, MMIFF, 
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PDCF, CPFF and TSLF are intended to operate until February 1, 2010, whereas the TALF 
shall stay in place until December 31, 2009. It is possible to determine an explicit exit date 
since most of these instruments are designed as loans with a limited term or include purchases 
of short-term securities (for example in the case of the CPFF) that simply run off if no new 
transactions are conducted. It is not that easy when turning to the purchase programs of long-
term US Treasury securities and agency debt or agency MBS, respectively. In these cases, the 
Fed announced upper limits for the total amounts to be obtained. Notwithstanding that, most 
of these instruments are designed to become unattractive when market conditions improve 
and funding via the market becomes an option again so that in such an environment, eligible 
counterparties increasingly loose interest in obtaining liquidity through these facilities (Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009c; Bernanke 2009a). 
 
5.2. Active QE  
 
5.2.1. Japan 
In order to achieve the aims constituting the first and the second pillar of the Japanese QE 
approach – the CAB target and a sustainable (positive) rate of inflation – the BoJ heavily 
increased the amount of monthly outright purchases of long-term JGBs from 400 billion yen 
at the introduction of QE to 1200 billion yen in October 2002 (Chart 19) (see Ito 2005, p. 
116). 
When looking at these figures, one is tempted to presume that in Japan, active QE and QE in 
general to a large extend consisted of increased purchases of the above-mentioned long-term 
government bonds (JGBs), whereas other forms of active QE that provide liquidity on a short-
term basis (such as outright purchases of TBs/FBs), open market operations like repurchase 
agreements and also passive QE might have played just a minor role in achieving the CAB 
targets. And indeed, when examining the percentage change in the BoJ’s outright holdings of 
short- and long-term assets between January 2001 – shortly before the introduction of QE – 
and the QE period, this impression receives some confirmation: While the increase in the 
outstanding amount of short-term fund supplying operations (which, besides short-term 
outright purchases, also include various kinds of repurchase agreements) on the bank’s 
balance sheet peaked in March 2002 with a value that exceeded the one at the beginning of 
2001 by about 50 percent, the BoJ’s stock of JGB holdings temporarily (February 2005) 
reached 160 percent of its initial value (Chart 20). This pattern is, although a little bit less 
obvious, also present when looking at Chart 21, which graphs the development of the absolute 
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amount outstanding of short- and long-term operations (see BoJ Time-Series Data Search 
2009c).  
By going a little bit more into detail, that is decomposing short-term open market operations 
into its components, the reliance of the BoJ on JGB purchases for achieving the CAB target 
becomes even more obvious (Chart 22). JGB holdings are by far the largest single component 
of outright holdings on the BoJ’s balance sheet, followed, with some distance, by outright 
holdings of TBs/FBs and bills. 
Yet the dominant position of JGB purchases is not the only thing that one can see when 
looking at this chart. During the course of 2002, the BoJ stopped conducting JGB repos as 
well as purchases of TBs/FBs under repurchase agreements, which serves as an explanation 
for the sharp decline of these two components during this particular year. As a substitute for 
these two operations, the Japanese central bank switched to purchases of JGSs (JGBs, 
TBs/FBs) under repurchase agreements. This is a consequence of the abolishment of a tax on 
securities trading in 1999 that made it more favorable for JGB traders to engage in repurchase 
agreements rather than in “borrowing of JGBs”. The absolute amount of this newly 
introduced repurchase agreement did, however, not measure up to its predecessors. The most 
important component for short-term liquidity provision was, as already noted, the outright 
purchase of bills. This is not without good reason, as counterparties were able to use a broad 
range of pooled collateral for bill operations with the BoJ (see 2.1.1.2.). What is more, in 
October 2002 the maximum maturity of this instrument had been extended from six month to 
one year, thereby enabling counterparties to secure longer-term funding needs.  
What can also be seen from the chart is that despite the dominant position of JGB purchases 
in the BoJ’s QE strategy, the central bank maintained the already mentioned broad diversity 
of instruments at its disposal. First, this was, as stated above, necessary to smooth short-term 
fluctuations of autonomous factors. But especially in an environment of zero short-term 
interest rates, some market segments might turn illiquid, as a result of too high transaction 
costs. Therefore, the BoJ can maintain a certain degree of liquidity by focusing on a relatively 
large number of instruments, i.e. a broad range of markets (see BoJ Time-Series Data Search 
2009c and Bank of Japan 2003, p. 4-5). 
The manifold variety of instruments was also maintained under the QE policy in order to 
avoid becoming over-dependent on JGB purchases. The BoJ wanted to avoid this because 
first, a large amount of JGBs on the bank’s balance sheet might limit the ability to conduct 
short-term operations unless it sells part of its JGB holdings. And secondly, the BoJ worried 
that market participants could conceive this as an attempt to finance government expenditures. 
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Hence the BoJ continued to keep the total outstanding amount of JGBs, on average, at or 
below the volume of banknotes in circulation (Chart 4 above) (see Maeda et al. 2005, p.10). 
Concerning the maturity of open market operations under the QE policy, both short-term and 
long-term (i.e. JGBs) market operations converged somewhat: In the MPM of May 18, 2001, 
the policy board decided to expand the maturity-spectrum eligible for outright purchases of 
JGBs to include not only 10- and 20-year but also 2-, 4- and 6-year government securities 
(Chart 23 and for comparison Chart 3 above). On the other hand, the BoJ increased the 
maturity for many of its short-term funds supplying operations in order to make bidding more 
attractive since a longer time horizon of short-term operations enables counterparties to better 
secure their future liquidity needs. For instance, the maturity of outright purchases of bills was 
extended from six month to one year (see Bank of Japan 2002, p. 4 and Bank of Japan 2009d). 
Apart from modifications of the maturity spectrum, there were also changes regarding the 
number of counterparties as well as the range of eligible collateral. Concerning the first, the 
number of banks and other financial institutions that are allowed to engage in transactions 
with the BoJ had been raised from 30-50 to nearly 150 (as of 2004), also including foreign 
banks. The main motivation behind this was warranting smooth functioning of open market 
operations. With respect to the latter, the BoJ decided at its MPMs of December 17, 2002 and 
April 30, 2003 to accept loans on deeds with original maturities from five to ten years, asset 
backed commercial papers (ABCP) and loans on deeds to the “Industrial Revitalization 
Corporation of Japan (IRCJ)”, which is a government-backed agency created to rehabilitate 
heavily indebted but viable companies, as eligible collateral. Since eligibility criteria for 
collateral are stated in the “Guidelines on Eligible Collateral” that also formulate the range of 
eligible collateral that can be used by financial institutions to obtain funds through the 
discount window, these amendments to the “Guidelines on Eligible Collateral” made discount 
window borrowing less difficult as well.  The inclusion of these products was intended to 
make it easier for counterparties to refinance them and, in the case of ABCP, to foster the 
development of the markets for securitized products (see minutes of the MPM on 12/17/2002 
and 04/30/2002, Maeda et al. 2005, p. 6, Bank of Japan 2004a, p. 305 and Bank of Japan 
2009e). 
But permitting ABCP as eligible collateral has not been the only action the BoJ undertook in 
order to promote securitized products. One of the main problems of the Japanese economy 
was the fact that the financial intermediary function of Japanese banks was still weak. 
Therefore, the policy board adopted at its MPM on June 25, 2003 the “Principal Terms and 
Conditions for the Outright Purchase of Asset-Backed Securities” to “secure smooth corporate 
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financing and stimulate the flow of funds in the economy” (MPM on 06/10/2003). This 
measure, which was limited in time, was one of the few new instruments that have been 
introduced during the QE regime. In practice, the BoJ bought Asset Backed Securities (ABS) 
and ABCP, whose respective markets have dried up (Chart 24). Eligible for purchase were 
ABS and ABCP consisting of at least 50 percent of assets related to small and medium-sized 
companies. Furthermore, if the underlying assets were pools of bank loans, the initial 
borrower had to be classified as “normal”. The range of possible ABS or ABCP was further 
limited by the fact that they had to be rated BB or higher by all rating agencies. The 
purchasing procedure depended upon whether ABS or ABCP should be bought. In the first 
case, the BoJ conducted public offerings to determine both the amount and the purchase price. 
This was necessary because under the prevailing circumstances, no reliable market price 
could be obtained. In the latter case, the BoJ decided to use competitive auctions as the 
volume in the secondary market was relatively high. When looking at Chart 22, one can 
already see that the overall volume of outright purchases of ABS and ABCP was not very 
large (ABS/ABCP purchases were regarded as short-term operations). In fact, compared to 
the other outright holdings of the BoJ, it is not even noticeable. Right from the beginning, 
these operations were intended to play only a minor role in the bank’s outright operations. 
Hence the maximum amount outstanding has been set at 1 trillion yen with the further 
condition that for ABS, the amount purchased shall not exceed 50 percent of the overall 
amount of an issue to avoid price distortions. As mentioned above, the BoJ regarded the 
ABS/ABCP purchase program solely as a temporary measure, already stating the termination 
date in its outline (March 2006). In January 2004, the regulatory framework specifying the 
conduct of ABS/ABCP transactions with the BoJ was relaxed in order to further promote 
smooth corporate financing (see minutes of the MPM on 06/10/2003 and 06/25/2003). 
 
5.2.2. USA 
The way and the premises under which the American central bank conducted open market 
operations were fundamentally different from the Japanese approach. As most western central 
banks, the Fed relied on the already mentioned structural deficit, which essentially means 
occasional outright purchases of long-term securities accompanied with rather frequent 
repurchase agreements to deal with short-dated liquidity needs. During the course of 2007, 
however, the modifications made to the primary credit rate as well as the introduction of new 
instruments such as the TAF prompted the Fed to abandon this policy because rising levels of 
reserves at the Fed caused by these novelties would have threatened the effective federal 
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funds rate to trade below the target, which was still relatively high in 2007 (August 2007: 5.25 
percent). Therefore the Fed decided to rely more on repurchase agreements and less on 
outright purchases of securities than in the past. As a consequence, redemptions of securities – 
until then very uncommon – were made in order to keep total reserves on a level consistent 
with the prevailing federal funds target rate. It is obvious that this is a striking contrast to the 
Japanese monetary policy stance during the QE regime, which continuously increased the 
target levels for total reserves as well as for long-term government securities purchases 
(JGBs).  
In 2008, with the introduction of further facilities to provide liquidity to different kinds of 
market participants (primary dealers and depository institutions, for example), also the need 
for offsetting the effects on total reserves caused by these instruments increased substantially. 
Hence the Fed not only redeemed maturing securities but also sold a substantial amount 
outright. But the conduct of repurchase agreements had undergone substantial changes as 
well: Under normal circumstances, the Fed accepts three different classes of collateral in its 
repurchase agreement auctions (“tranches”), taking into account differences in the quality of 
the assets included in each tranche. After the financial turmoil had started, however, market 
participants primarily supplied Agency MBS as collateral, which is contained in the last 
tranche. Therefore, on March 7, the Fed decided to introduce a single-tranche repurchase 
agreement with a maturity of 28 days, in which US Treasury securities, Agency debentures or 
Agency MBS are all equally eligible as collateral. Effectively, primary dealers will only 
supply Agency MBS since this is the cheapest type of collateral. By providing the 
counterparties with a financing source for Agency MBS, the Fed aimed at, among others, 
stabilizing the whole market for these products. The maximum amount outstanding of this 
instrument was expected not to exceed $100 billion. Except from this action, there were, in 
contrast to the Japanese monetary policy between 2001 and 2006, no major changes with 
respect to the range of collateral eligible in open market operations. When looking at Chart 
25, one can see that there is a notable increase in repurchase agreements setting in in March 
2008 (note: TAF has not been included because it is a new instrument, which makes the 
calculation of relative values rather meaningless because the low starting basis would result in 
skyrocketing growth rates). This hike is caused by the introduction of the just mentioned 
single-tranche repurchase agreements. Yet the American central bank still faced the problem 
that the newly introduced facilities threatened to cause a level of total reserves inconsistent 
with the prevailing federal funds target. To deal with it, the Fed abolished in September its 
traditional overnight, 7- and 14-day repurchase agreements, thereby causing a sharp decline in 
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the outstanding amount of repurchase agreements around October 2008, as can be seen in 
Chart 25. Finally, in February 2009, the Fed decided to abandon also the single-tranche 
repurchase agreement, since the imposed limit had almost been reached. In addition to this, 
the Fed used reverse repurchase agreements to counterbalance the nearly exponential 
increases in total reserves, which it did especially in the last quarter of 2008: Between end of 
May 2008 and end of December 2008, the average amount outstanding of reverse repurchase 
agreements increased by about 125 percent. However, compared to total reserves, which had 
increased by as much as 1777 percent over the same period of time, it is obvious that the 
impact of this measure was rather limited.  
As a consequence, the Fed opted for a major policy change: Prior to mid-September, the Desk 
was quite successful in keeping the effective federal funds rate at or close to its target (Chart 
15 above). But the financial turmoil and the increasing need to offset the effects of the new 
instruments on total reserves made this task more and more difficult, if not to say impossible. 
On October 6, in order to find a way out of this dilemma, the Fed announced to pay interest 
on both required and excess reserves, which could be viewed as a kind of lending facility. In 
its statement, the Fed expressed the hope that this step “will give the Federal Reserve greater 
scope to use its lending programs to address conditions in credit markets while also 
maintaining the federal funds rate close to the target […]” (see Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System 2008b). Interest rates on required and excess reserves were set below 
the prevailing federal funds target rate. In theory, this measure should enable the Fed to keep 
the short-term interest rate at its target while at the same time allowing for a level of excess 
reserves that would, under normal circumstances, not be consistent with the target rate. 
However, due to the fact that GSE were not eligible for obtaining interest payments on their 
reserves, they continued selling their liquidity in the market at any possible rate, thereby 
depressing the effective federal funds rate below its target. Furthermore, banks were not 
willing to arbitrage by obtaining funds at relatively low rates in the market and putting them 
on their accounts at the Fed to earn interest. Finally on December 17, shortly after the FOMC 
decided to set the federal funds target rate as a corridor ranging from 0 to 0.25 percent, it set 
the interest rate applicable on required and excess reserves to 0.25 percent as well.  
In any case, by allowing for higher total (i.e. excess) reserves and therefore also for an 
expansion of the balance sheet, the Fed was not forced anymore to sterilize the effects of the 
newly introduced instruments and therefore established the basis for QE in the true sense of 
the word, as it is sketched in section 4.3.3. . That involves also purchases of additional 
securities that are not primarily aimed at keeping the effective federal funds rate at a certain 
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level but at influencing conditions in specific markets. Until then, the Fed was basically 
changing the composition of its balance sheet, while keeping the overall size more or less 
constant, thereby complying with 4.3.2. This, however, marks a sharp contrast not only to the 
Japanese implementation of QE, but also to the public opinion, which believed that the use of 
new or the extension of existing instruments rather automatically comes along with an 
increase in the size of the balance sheet (see Federal Reserve Bank of New 2008, p. 16-17; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009a, p.4-12; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2008a; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008b, Jobst 
2009, p. 70).  
Due to the Fed’s efforts to sterilize the effects of the newly introduced instruments, it had to, 
as stated above, redeem or even sell a considerable amount of its US Treasury securities 
holdings. Thus, the value of the securities held in the SOMA decreased by nearly 40 percent 
between the end of 2006 and the end of 2008, thereby constituting the first decline since 1989. 
Then again, the consequent reductions of the federal funds target rate to finally 0 - 0.25 
percent, which allows for a higher degree of volatility, as well as the decision to pay interest 
on required and excess reserves, mitigated the need to offset the impact of the new 
instruments. And with strains in financial markets reaching a new dimension caused by the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 and a further deteriorating housing 
market, the Fed decided to purchase different kinds of securities to influence conditions in the 
respective markets directly. More precisely, the Federal Reserve announced on November 25 
to purchase GSE debt and MBS backed by Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and Ginnie Mae since 
over the past few months, spreads to US Treasury debt had widened and liquidity had dried up 
considerably in these markets. This was an important step because of their importance for 
housing markets and financial markets in general. In practice, the purchases of these two asset 
classes are implemented as follows: When it comes to GSE debt, the Fed instructs the Desk to 
conduct multiple-price competitive auctions for obtaining these securities from primary 
dealers. Concerning MBS, the Federal Reserve pursues a somewhat different approach. Since 
the characteristics of MBS are more complicated than those of the other assets in the SOMA 
portfolio, the Fed decided to entrust external investment managers with this task. These are 
BlackRock Inc., Goldman Sachs Asset Management, PIMO and Wellington Management 
Company, LLP. Similar to the GSE debt purchase procedure, these investment managers are 
only allowed to obtain MBS from primary dealers. Initially, the Fed planned to purchase up to 
$100 billion in GSE debt and up to $500 billion in MBS, beginning in January 2009. Yet on 
March 18, these limits had been raised to $200 billion and $1.25 trillion, respectively.  
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By proceeding to not only buying government securities, the Fed follows a similar approach 
than the BoJ did several years ago. However, the Japanese central bank purchased only ABCP 
and ABS backed primarily by loans or securities related to small and medium-sized 
companies. But not only the types of securitized products that are/were included in the 
respective purchase programs differ from each other. Also the total amounts bought in Japan 
and in the US, respectively, are/were very different. Since the comparison of absolute 
numbers is not very meaningful, the respective importance of such purchases is stated relative 
to the other securities held in the portfolios of the two central banks under consideration. In 
Japan, outright holdings of ABS amounted to not more than 0.34 percent (08/2004) of total 
securities held in the portfolio of the BoJ. In contrast, the SOMA consisted of as much as 46 
percent of GSE debt and MBS in May 2009. This can also be seen in Chart 26, which graphs 
the total securities holdings of the Fed. 
But what is also obvious is that the amount of US Treasury securities held outright not only 
stopped its downward trend, but actually increased in April 2009. This is owed to the fact that 
on March 18, the Fed unveiled plans to purchase long-term US Treasury securities worth up 
to $300 billion with maturities ranging from 2- to 10-years. As usual, these transactions are 
conducted between the Desk and the primary dealers. With this step, whose announcement 
caught market participants by surprise, the Fed aims at helping to “improve conditions in 
private credit markets” (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009b) 
through the reduction of “intermediate- and long-term interest rates by bringing down the 
term premium on these securities” (see Kohn 2009).   
Concerning the overall maturity of US Treasury securities held in the SOMA portfolio, there 
was a distinct shift away from rather short-term (less than 1 year) to medium- and long-term 
securities (Chart 27), which is the result of redemptions and sales of Treasury bills during 
2007 and 2008 as well as the just mentioned purchases of long-term US Treasury securities 
(see Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009a, p. 15-16; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2008c; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008d; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2009b; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009b; 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009c; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009d; 
FT.com 2009). 
Finally, the last instrument to be discussed in this subsection is the “Term Auction Facility 
(TAF)”, which had been introduced on December 12, 2007, thereby being the first newly 
introduced instrument under the Fed’s QE policy. In principle, the TAF is comparable to open 
market operations with the distinction that depository institutions (in sound financial 
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conditions) and not primary dealers are allowed to participate. Funds obtained through this 
facility have to be collateralized by discount window collateral, which is, as stated in 2.2.1., 
much broader than the collateral eligible in normal open market operations. Thus, by 
introducing an additional way to canalize liquidity into the banking system accompanied by 
an extension of the range of eligible collateral, the Fed directly addresses strains in the 
interbank market and acts, to a certain degree, as a deputy for it. At the moment, the Fed 
conducts auctions of 28-day and 84-day credit, alternating on a biweekly basis with $150 
billion offered in each auction. As can be seen in Chart 26, the outstanding amount increased 
steadily since its introduction, especially in recent months (see Bernanke 2008; Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007a; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2008e; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008f). 
 
5.3. Passive QE 
 
5.3.1. Japan 
As already noted, to achieve the CAB target, the BoJ primarily relied upon increasing its 
monthly purchases of JGBs, that is, active QE. Passive QE, on the other hand, had not been 
very elaborate. It basically consisted of reductions and modifications of the basic loan rate and 
the introduction of the so called “securities lending facility”. 
Before and during the QE regime, the policy board decided several times to lower the basic 
loan rate: In February 2001, it has been lowered from 0.5 to 0.35 percent, followed by another 
cut in March 2001, which brought the basic loan rate down to 0.25 percent. By setting it at 0.1 
percent in September 2001, the BoJ ended the cycle of cuts of the rate applicable to the 
Complementary Lending Facility and kept it there for nearly 5 years. At the same time, the 
difference between the discount rate and the uncollateralized overnight call rate target 
decreased from 0.25 to 0.1 percent (Chart 28). 
Except from lowering the basic loan rate, which is nothing remarkable since it is also done 
under normal circumstances, the Japanese central bank suspended the rule that counterparties 
are not allowed to use this facility more than five business days during each maintenance 
period unless they pay a premium of 2 percent on the basic loan rate. For the reserve 
maintenance period beginning on September 16, 2001 and ending on October 15, 2001, the 
maximum of days had been raised to 10 business days. Between March 1, 2002 and April 15, 
2002, eligible counterparties were allowed to borrow at the borrowing facility on every 
business day without facing the additional charge of 2 percent. Finally, the policy board 
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decided at its MPM on March 25, 2003 to suspend the rule limiting the use of the 
Complementary Lending Facility for an indefinite period of time. Again, the inclusion of 
several new types of collateral, loans on deeds, for example, into the “Guidelines on Eligible 
Collateral” (see 5.2.1.) also applied to the Complementary Lending Facility. Hence, 
counterparties could choose from a wider range of collateral when obtaining funds through 
this standing facility. What these modifications of the Complementary Lending Facility had in 
common was the fact that all of them were intended to stabilize the financial system and make 
short-term financing easier for financial institutions (see minutes of the MPM on 09/18/2001, 
02/28/2002, 03/25/2003). 
The securities lending facility, on the other hand, is in fact a completely new measure and not 
just a modification of an existing one, like in the previous case. However, it is not a “pure” 
passive QE measure, although it presumably fits the best into this category. The BoJ intended 
it to provide “Japanese government securities held by the Bank to the markets” for 
“enhancing liquidity and maintaining the smooth functioning of government securities 
markets”. This was necessary because “in government securities markets, liquidity may 
decline and pricing may be hampered occasionally when market participants experience 
difficulties in securing specific issues or face uncertainties over their availability” (see 
minutes of the MPM on 04/09/2004).  Therefore, on April 09, 2004, the policy board 
approved the “Principal Terms and Conditions for the Sale of Japanese Government 
Securities with Repurchase Agreements to Provide the Markets with a Secondary Source of 
Japanese Government Securities”, which acted as the framework for providing JGSs to 
counterparties. In practice, the BoJ conducted sales of JGSs under repurchase agreements. 
The JGSs sold had to be repurchased on the following business day. Principally, the BoJ 
initiates a competitive auction of JGSs if at least two counterparties request it. Yet the central 
bank kept itself the option to conduct auctions at its discretion if it believes that conditions on 
financial markets necessitate it (see Bank of Japan 2004b, p. 28-29; minutes of the MPM on 
04/09/2004; Bank of Japan 2004c). 
 
5.3.2. USA 
In theory, with its discount window, the Fed already has a powerful tool attributable to 
passive QE at its disposal that can be used to address strains in interbank markets since 
depository institutions, which are (under normal circumstances) not allowed to act as 
counterparties in the Fed’s open market operations, can use this standing facility to obtain 
theoretically unlimited amounts of liquidity at their discretion. In practice, however, banks are 
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very reluctant to make use of this instrument: Because other financial institutions might 
associate the use of this standing facility by a particular bank as a sign of weakness or of 
serious liquidity problems, the discount window is associated with a “stigma”. This effect is 
even exacerbated in times of financial instability, when liquidity problems of financial 
institutions might indeed be a reasonable concern. Thus, while at least in theory the discount 
window is a proper measure to increase the liquidity in the banking system, it turns out to be 
not sufficient for addressing the current strains in the financial system. As a consequence, 
except from modifying its discount window program, the Fed introduced several new 
facilities attributable to passive QE. 
The first step towards passive QE, however, was, as already noted, in fact a modification of 
the primary credit discount window facility. On August 17, 2007, the Fed decided to reduce 
the spread between the primary credit rate and the federal funds target rate from 100 to 50 
basis points, followed by a further reduction to 25 basis points on March 16, 2008. 
Furthermore, depository institutions got the opportunity to obtain primary credit loans for 
terms of at first 30 days (decided on 08/17/2007), which had been extended to 90 days at the 
just mentioned Board meeting in March 2008.  
A reduction of the spread between the interest rate applicable to the borrowing facility and the 
targeted short-term interest rate was also a policy measure pursued by the BoJ. Hence this 
instrument (or rather this modification of an existing instrument) is one of the very few 
instruments attributable to passive QE that both central banks implemented under their 
respective QE regimes. Differences exist, however, with respect to the term of loans granted 
through this standing facility as well as the range of eligible collateral: Whereas the Fed 
currently limits the use of this instrument to 90 day, its Japanese counterpart later on 
suspended all rules limiting the usage with respect to the time period. Furthermore, the 
modifications made to the “Guidelines on Eligible Collateral” in Japan also applied to the 
Complementary Lending Facility. The Fed, on the other hand, made no modifications to the 
types of collateral eligible for obtaining funds through the discount window, apparently 
because the range of discount window collateral had already been very extensive even before 
the financial turmoil set in.   
In the US, the modifications made to the discount window, which were not only intended to 
increase the liquidity in the banking system but also to smooth movements of the effective 
federal funds rate, had some success though: As can be seen in Chart 29, depository 
institutions did make use of this facility: While the monthly average of outstanding primary 
credit loans amounted only to $52.25 millions in July 2007, this value peaked in November 
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2008 with as much as $97.64 billions outstanding. Since then, this number declined 
considerably, party reflecting diminishing strains in financial markets. Thus, as some banks 
also started using this facility when the effective federal funds rate did not exhibit upward 
pressure because they more and more considered it as a source of ordinary liquidity supply, 
the discount window lost some of its stigma. Nonetheless, circumstances warranted that more 
had to be done (see Bernanke 2008; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009a, p. 17; Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2007b; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2008g). 
Therefore, on March 16, 2008, the Fed decided to introduce the “Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF)”. This instrument is very similar to the previously discussed discount 
window, with the interest rate applicable to this instrument being the primary credit rate and 
the most striking difference being the fact that it is directed not at depository institutions but 
at primary dealers (which participate via their clearing banks), thereby enabling also these 
institutions to obtain loans from the Fed. Furthermore, loans are granted only on an overnight 
basis and have to be collateralized by assets that can be deposed in tri-party repo systems (i.e. 
a repo construction where a clearing organization acts as an intermediary between the 
borrower and the lender). This measure, which is aimed at improving “the ability of primary 
dealers to provide financing to participants in securitization markets” (see Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System 2008g), is also comparable to the discount window when it 
comes to the amount outstanding (Chart 29) (see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System 2008g; Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008h; Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, 2009e).  
As in Japan, the Fed also introduced new or modified existing securities lending facilities. 
And again, these measures are not pure passive QE since they provide eligible counterparties 
not with funds directly but with US Treasury securities which are, in turn, exchanged for 
liquidity on financial markets. What is more, an essential characteristic of passive QE, namely 
the fact that participation is at the counterparties´ discretion, is missing since the Fed conducts 
these operations at fixed dates. Nevertheless, the securities lending facilities still share most 
commonalities with passive QE, wherefore they are included in this subsection. Since these 
instruments have all the same purpose and are akin for the most part, it should be sufficient to 
focus on the general procedure of securities lending facilities in the US and to restrict to 
detailed descriptions only if the peculiarities deem it necessary.  
Prior to the outbreak of the financial turmoil, financial institutions used different kinds of 
securities to obtain funds in the respective markets. Yet after the problems related to subprime 
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loans became pressing, obtaining loans collateralized by MBS or ABS consisting of various 
kinds of consumer loans became virtually impossible. As a consequence, the markets for these 
assets dried up. One of the very few asset classes still accepted in such transactions were US 
Treasury securities. This, however, lead to the scarcity of these securities, thereby threatening 
also the liquidity of this particular market, and to financial institutions facing refinancing 
problems as they already exhausted their most liquid securities and were not able to obtain 
funding through their securitized assets (i.e. MBS and ABS). Under these circumstances, the 
Fed introduced new or modified existing instruments in order to provide primary dealers with 
US Treasury securities, which, in turn, can be used to obtain liquidity in financial markets. 
Since in these operations government debt is exchanged for other securities and not for 
liquidity directly, they are reserve neutral. That is, the overall size of the balance sheet is not 
affected. The range of eligible collateral – depending on the specific program – consists of 
various securities, also including many assets whose respective markets have dried up and 
therefore can not be used any more to obtain liquidity on the market. The oldest and at the 
same time the most restrictive of these instruments is the so called “SOMA Securities 
Lending” that belonged to the Fed’s toolkit already before the financial turmoil had started. 
Under this facility, primary dealers, which are addressed by this facility, can obtain nearly all 
maturities of US Treasury securities held in the SOMA portfolio through competitive 
multiple-price auctions. The term of this operation is overnight and has to be collateralized 
again with different kinds of US Treasury. The “Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF)”, in 
contrast, is a recently introduced (03/11/2008) instrument that differs with respect to the range 
of eligible collateral, the auction method, the term as well as the frequency of operations. It is 
generally not as strict as the previously discussed facility. Hence primary dealers can pledge 
as collateral in the weekly single-price auctions not only US Treasury securities but also GSE 
debt, GSE MBS and, every other week, investment grade debt securities in addition to the 
previously mentioned assets. The term of this instrument is currently 28 days – considerably 
longer than the one applicable to the SOMA Securities Lending. Finally, on July 30, 2008, the 
Fed introduced the “Term Securities Lending Facility Options Program (TOP)”, which differs 
somewhat from the other two securities lending facilities: Based on the TSLF, the Fed offers 
options at undetermined dates that, if exercised, entail the right to obtain US Treasury 
securities against all kinds of TSLF collateral with terms of usually two weeks or less. 
Primary dealers can not sell or exercise the options prior to a predetermined date since they 
are constructed as European options. With this arrangement, the Fed aims at providing 
primary dealers with a means to secure their need for US Treasury securities in advance of 
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periods that are generally characterized by increased strains in financial markets, such as 
quarter-ends (see New York times 05/03/2008; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009f-k; 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 2008i; Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System 2008j). 
In summary, when it comes to passive QE (together with the related measures in the next 
subsection), one cannot overemphasize the fact that the Fed appears to be far more active than 
its Japanese counterpart during 2001 and 2006, which can be attributed to the different kinds 
of problem pressures the two central banks under consideration are/have been exposed to: 
While the BoJ primarily focused on fighting deflation, the Fed focuses on relieving strains in 
financial markets: With malfunctioning interbank markets that provide insufficient amounts 
of liquidity even when market participants can supply highly rated collateral, the Fed tries to 
engage with all kinds of sound market participants as directly as possible to provide them with 
sufficient funding, thereby undertaking to some extend the function of interbank markets. 
 
5.4. Direct Lending to Borrowers and Investors 
The previously discussed instruments and programs of the first and second pillar of the Fed’s 
QE approach, though party very different, have something in common: All of them refer to 
transactions between the Fed on the one hand, and either primary dealers or depository 
institutions on the other hand. The third pillar of QE in the US, in contrast, could be described 
as “the most unconventional of the unconventional” measures for addressing the current 
financial problems. In the US, the commercial paper market is one of the most important 
sources of unsecured short-term funding for banks and large companies enjoying an excellent 
credit rating. Funds obtained on this market are usually used to meet short dated debt 
obligations, such as payrolls. The securitization market, by contrast, plays a key role in the 
provision of consumer credits like car and student loans. In the wake of the financial crisis, 
however, these markets dried up substantially. As a result, yields on these assets increased 
considerably and, with respect to commercial papers, issuers faced difficulties to roll over 
their existing liabilities. While the measures discussed so far address these problems – as 
already mentioned – only indirectly, the Fed also implemented some instruments to deal with 
borrowers and investors in these markets in a direct way: On October 7, 2008, the American 
central bank decided to install the so called “Commercial Paper Funding Facility (CPFF)”. 
Although the Fed again engages in transactions with primary dealers, they merely act as 
intermediaries through which issuers of commercial papers (including asset backed 
commercial papers) can sell these assets to the Fed, or more specifically, to a special purpose 
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vehicle (SPV) founded and capitalized by the Fed. This facility is addressed only to (US) 
issuers of newly issued (dollar-denominated) commercial papers (maturity: less than 3 
months). Thus, purchases from investors on the secondary market are not planned. 
Furthermore, commercial papers have to have an excellent credit rating by at least one major 
rating organization. Issuers, on the other hand, have to prove that they not just recently 
entered the market for commercial papers in anticipation of the Fed’s stabilization measures 
by demonstrating their activity in the first eight months of 2008. In any case, this facility was 
designed rather as a last resource for issuers of commercial papers, which manifests itself in 
the fact that issuers not only have to pay a fee (as discounts on the proceeds) when selling 
their commercial papers to the SPV but also when they register for the general right to 
participate in this program. Once the SPV obtained commercial papers from an issuer, it holds 
them until maturity (see Bernanke 2009b; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009l; Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York 2009m). 
However, a major source of disruptions in the commercial paper market is stemming from 
money market mutual funds, which are significant participants in this market: Due to large 
outflows of capital caused by investors withdrawing their shares in these funds, the fund 
managers are forced to conduct “fire sales” of their assets. To counteract this development, 
the Fed introduced (on 10/21/2008) the “Money Market Investor Funding Facility (MMIFF)”. 
This instrument is intended to provide funding to currently five private sector SPV, which, in 
turn, purchase commercial papers issued by highly rated financial institutions and other 
money market instruments from eligible investors, such as money market mutual funds. 
Except from funding obtained from the MMIFF, the SPV finances these purchases by selling 
ABCP to investors worth 10 percent of the amount the investors wish to sell to the SPV (see 
Bernanke 2009a; Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009n; Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York 2009o). 
Finally, to address the previously mentioned frictions in the securitization market, the Fed 
announced on November 25, 2008 to implement the “Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan 
Facility (TALF)”. Any US company that maintains an account relationship with a primary 
dealer and possesses eligible collateral, namely ABS backed by loans such as auto loans, 
student loans or credit card loans can obtain TALF loans on predetermined dates. This last 
characteristic contrasts with the two just mentioned instruments, which are at the discretion of 
the respective counterparty. Another difference is the fact that the TALF is a joint initiative of 
the Fed and the US Treasury Department. In particular, the Fed creates a SPV that purchases 
from the Fed the assets received in connection with the TALF. The “US Treasury’s Troubled 
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Asset Relief Program (TARP)” purchases debt issued by the SPV worth $20 billion to 
facilitate the purchases of the first TALF loans. If the amount outstanding of TALF loans 
exceeds $20 billion, the Fed committed itself to provide the needed liquidity, limiting its total 
engagement to $200 billion (see Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009p).  
Concerning the overall size of these three programs (Chart 29), one can easily see that the 
CPFF is by far the largest program, also compared to passive QE, with the TALF only in 
recent months showing any, though still negligible, activity and the MMIFF lacking any 
transactions. The amount outstanding of the CPFF peaked in mid-January 2009 and is already 
declining again. This is the result of improving conditions in commercial paper markets, party 
caused by the CPFF itself (see Bernanke 2009b). 
As mentioned above, the Japanese central bank also adopted measures to promote the market 
for (asset baked) commercial papers. In contrast to the US, however, they were solely limited 
to outright purchases of these assets. What is more, the overall size of these actions relative to 
the overall size of the balance sheet is by far bigger in the US than in Japan: Whereas the Fed 
granted loans to investors and borrowers in these markets summing up to about 8 percent of 
total assets on its balance sheet (as of 05/21/2009), which is already less than at the beginning 
of the year, the BoJ’s purchases of ABS including ABCP accounted only for 0.2 percent of its 
asset side of the balance sheet (as of 08/20/2004). 
 
5.5. Effects/ Success of QE 
 
5.5.1. Balance Sheet 
 
5.5.1.1. Japan 
Conditional on the change of the operational target under the QE regime, CABs held at the 
BoJ increased dramatically: While CABs amounted to 5 trillion yen in January 2001, this 
value had risen to 31.2 trillion yen by March 2006 (Chart 30), which is an increase of 524 
percent (see BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009g).  
Therefore one has to pose the question to what extent this development affected the balance 
sheet of the Japanese central bank.  
In general, whenever a central bank conducts transactions, regardless of the specific form, the 
central bank balance sheet is directly affected. What is more, every operation enters the 
balance sheet twice: once on the asset and once on the liabilities side.  So, for example, if the 
BoJ purchases JGBs worth 100 billion yen on an outright basis to provide liquidity to the 
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market, the asset side increases by 100 billion yen since obviously JGBs are assets that are 
added to the existing stock of JGBs holdings. The liabilities side, on the other hand, also 
increases by 100 billion yen, which comes as follows: The BoJ bought the JGBs from a 
counterparty and paid for it with yen. In practice, the BoJ credits the counterparty’s account at 
the BoJ with the respective amount. And since CABs are a component of the liabilities side, 
the increase of 100 billion yen on the asset side is matched by an equal increase on the 
liabilities side of the balance sheet. Hence the total amounts of assets and liabilities always 
equal each other. But this example also points at another very important characteristic of 
central bank balance sheets: There are broad categories to which single items entering the 
balance sheet are assigned to. More specifically, the categories “autonomous factors” and 
“monetary policy operations” are contained both on the asset and the liabilities side. The 
category “reserves held by banks”, however, only shows up on the liabilities side because in 
the balance sheet identity, reserves are endogenous and are therefore expressed as a residual 
of the other components (Chart 31).  
That is, reserves (CABs) equal net monetary policy operations plus net autonomous factors 
(reserves = net monetary policy operations + net autonomous factors), which is also referred 
to as the “supply function of reserves”. If, for example, the BoJ increases its outright 
purchases of JGBs (i.e. the net amount of monetary policy operations increases), the BoJ 
increases, holding everything else unchanged, the supply of CABs (= reserves). The demand 
for CABs, on the other hand, depends on reserve requirements and the willingness of 
commercial banks to hold excess reserves. It is crucial for central banks to influence the 
equilibrium of supply and demand in a way that is consistent with the desired short-term 
interest rate target (see Bindseil 2004, p. 45-48).  
Having still in mind the previously discussed increases of JGB purchases and, as a 
consequence, of CABs, the enormous expansion of assets and liabilities on the BoJ’s balance 
sheet during the QE regime should come as no surprise. Between April 2001, shortly after the 
introduction of QE, and January 2006, shortly before the abolishment of QE, the balance sheet 
of the BoJ expanded from 112.3 to 152.6 trillion yen – an increase of 35 percent (Chart 32 
and 33). If we decompose these aggregate figures into its components, it is possible to 
recognize many of the developments mentioned so far.  When focusing on the autonomous 
factors, one can easily see that net autonomous factors are clearly negative, i.e. the 
autonomous factors on the liabilities side exceed the ones on the asset side (Chart 33). This is 
mainly the result of large amounts of banknotes in circulation, which form by far the largest 
single component of autonomous factors on the liabilities side. As already noted, the BoJ tried 
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to keep the growth of outright holdings of JGBs in line with the growth of banknotes in 
circulation. And indeed, the absolute increase of banknotes and JGBs holdings over the period 
under consideration is, although not equal, rather close (banknotes: +14.65 trillion yen; JGBs: 
+18.01 trillion yen). The drastic increase in net monetary policy operations of 42 percent is to 
a large extend based on these purchases of long-term securities, with short-term operations 
(TBs/FBs) also contributing significantly to this expansion of fund-supplying open market 
operations. Finally one can see that the BoJ was, at least in April 2001 and January 2006, 
successful in achieving its CAB targets. On April 30, 2001, the CABs amounted to 5.07 
trillion yen (= net omo + net autonomous factors = 79.92-74.43 = 5.49), which is only slightly 
above the target of 5 trillion yen. At the end of January 2006, CABs had risen to 32.93 trillion 
yen (= 114.04-81.12 = 32.92) – a number that is consistent with the target range of 30 to 35 
trillion yen (see Bank of Japan 2001a and Bank of Japan 2006b). 
To get an impression of how the single components of the balance sheet evolved over time, it 
is useful to illustrate their development graphically (Chart 34 and 35). The story told by the 
asset side (Chart 34) is that JGBs are, not surprisingly, the by far most important single 
component. On the liabilities side (Chart 35), the striking dominance of banknotes in 
circulation becomes apparent, as well as the enormous expansion of CABs. The fact that in 
May 2001, on both the asset and the liabilities side some components vanished and some 
others emerged, is owed to the fact that the BoJ introduced or abolished certain facilities. The 
sudden disappearance of JGSs accompanied by the emergence of JGBs and FBs/TBs is of 
rather technical nature since prior to April 2001, both categories made up JGSs but were 
stated separately from then on (see Bank of Japan 2001b). 
 
5.5.1.2. USA 
Initially, the Fed was quite successful in sterilizing the expansionary effects on total reserves 
and on the overall size of the balance sheet stemming from the newly introduced instruments: 
As can be seen in Chart 36 and 37, the TAF, TSLF, PDCF and TOP, although surely not 
irrelevant with respect to their size, did not lead to an increase of total reserves and, as a 
consequence, neither of the balance sheet.  
However, except from the fact that the Fed was successful in counterbalancing the effects of 
the new instruments in the first place, one cannot overlook that, as noted above, total reserves 
and the total assets/liabilities on the balance sheet skyrocketed in the last quarter of 2008.  
Naturally, this pattern is also exhibited by the Fed’s balance sheet (Chart 38): Between Mai 
2007, when the American central bank still conducted “business as usual”, and June 2009, 
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after the introduction of several “unconventional” monetary policy measures, the balance 
sheet more than doubled (+126 percent). The magnitude of this expansion is quite surprising, 
since it clearly outweighs the one of the BoJ’s balance sheet between 2001 and 2006 (+35 
percent), as can be seen in Chart 39. This trend is even more striking with respect to total 
reserves (same time periods): In Japan, this balance sheet item increased by 549 percent, 
whereas in the US, it shot up by as much as 7787 percent. Yet one should be careful when 
comparing changes of different central bank balance sheets or of major components of them 
since for addressing strains in financial markets, the composition of the balance sheet is at 
least equally important because one of the main problems was not an overall lack of liquidity 
in the banking system but a poor distribution of it. Furthermore, the size of the balance sheet 
does not necessarily reveal anything about the stance of monetary policy as the movements of 
the size of the balance sheet and the one of the interest rate target do not always coincide. 
When looking at the different categories of the Fed’s balance sheet, one can see that the basic 
patterns are roughly comparable to the ones of their Japanese counterparts: In both cases, net 
autonomous factors are negative and net monetary policy operations are positive, thereby also 
determining the amount of total reserves since this category is, as explained above, a residual 
of the two other components. But also with respect to the single items on the balance sheets, it 
is possible to identify certain commonalities. In both cases, the amounts of foreign currency 
assets, reverse repurchase agreements and securities held outright increased over the 
respective periods, while the outstanding amount of reverse repurchase agreements decreased 
in the Japanese as well as in the American case. There are also some items, however, that are 
unique to the Fed’s balance sheet, and hence need to be explained. Central bank liquidity 
swaps, for a start, refer to reciprocal currency arrangements between the Fed and other major 
central banks such as the ECB and the BoE to provide them with a source of US-Dollar since 
many of their national banks faced difficulties in refinancing themselves in this currency. 
These arrangements were introduced in December 2007 as a response to the strains in 
interbank markets. Nine months later (September 2008), the US Treasury announced to create 
the so called “Supplementary Financing Program (SFP)”, which should provide some 
assistance to the Fed’s monetary policy. Under this program, the Treasury issues short-term 
debt to drain reserves from the banking system. The proceeds are placed in the supplementary 
financing account at the Fed (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009q). 
Once again, a close look at the development over time of the single components reveals 
important insights into the way the Fed responded to stresses in interbank markets. The asset 
side (Chart 40) reveals that in the beginning, the American central bank was quite successful 
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in sterilizing the effects of the newly introduced instruments, as it has already been mentioned 
above. It did so by driving the outstanding amount of repurchase agreements down to zero 
and also by lowering its stock of securities held outright. Since not the overall amount of 
liquidity in the banking system was the problem but a maladjustment with respect to its 
distribution, the Fed’s primarily aim was rather to supply as many market participants as 
possible with needed liquidity than to increase the overall liquidity in the system. Yet with the 
introduction of purchase programs for securitized products and US Treasury securities in 
November 2008 and March 2009, respectively, this trend had been reversed. What can also be 
seen is the fact that in contrast to the Japanese case, where in March 2006, only government 
securities (including JGBs and FBs/TBs) accounted for nearly 65 percent of the asset side, the 
expansion of the Fed’s balance sheet is, at lest since October 2008, more broadly based. This 
is owed to the fact that it explicitly tries to address as many market participants as directly as 
possible and hence needs a larger set of instruments than the BoJ, which merely tried to 
achieve its CAB target. The component “Others” includes several other measures such as the 
previously mentioned central bank liquidity swaps or stabilizing measures for major financial 
institutions, such as AIG. The liabilities side of the Fed’s balance sheet, on the contrary, is a 
little bit leaner (Chart 41). The single most important component is the amount of currency in 
circulation. What is striking, though not surprising, is the enormous increase of reserves. And 
also the supplementary financing account has been expanded rapidly since its introduction. 
    
5.5.2. Long-Term Interest Rates (Yield Curve), Money Market Developments and Inflation 
 
5.5.2.1. Japan 
As stated above, central banks facing the zero-bound problem and aiming at lowering long-
term interest rates could shape expectations of how long interest rates will effectively remain 
zero, change the composition of the balance sheet and/or its overall size. With the second 
pillar, a clear exit strategy based on present and future inflation and the increases of JGBs 
purchases that not only changed the relative composition but also the overall size of the 
balance sheet, the BoJ fulfilled all three criteria. But how, if at all, did long-term interest rates 
as well as monetary aggregates respond? This question will be addressed in the following 
subsection. It should be noted, however, that the analysis is for the most part ,and with respect 
to the USA completely, of descriptive nature since a detailed analysis based on econometric 
methods lies beyond the scope of this diploma thesis and is not even available for the Fed’s 
current QE approach. However, there is recourse to existing findings in the literature where it 
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is appropriate. Therefore, it should be stressed that in those cases where no empirical results 
have been cited, movements in the described series could be the result of Japan’s QE policy, 
but this does not necessarily need to be the case.  
Concerning the effect of the QE policy on the JGBs yield curve (Chart 42), some doubts are 
appropriate to what extend QE actually influenced interest rates at the long end of the 
maturity spectrum. When considering only the first half of the QE period, one is tempted to 
conclude that this policy actually had been successful in flattening the yield curve. Shortly 
before the abolishment of QE, however, long-term interest rates climbed above the ones that 
had been recorded just before (01/31/01) and during QE (01/30/04). In his survey of empirical 
evidence on the effects of the Japanese QE policy, Ugai (2006) summed up the findings of 
several authors by stating that still the most significant effects on long-term interest rates 
stemmed from the commitment to maintain short-term interest rates (near) zero for a 
considerable period of time, which is the above mentioned policy duration effect. The 
empirical results on the expansion of the BoJ’s balance sheet by increasing the CABs and the 
changes in the composition of the balance sheet through increased purchases of JGBs are 
rather ambiguous: With respect to the first, Ugai (2006) concludes that only the signaling 
channel might have had a significant effect on long-term interest rates, whereas the portfolio 
rebalancing effect has not been, concerning to Ugai (2006), regarded as influential by the 
surveyed authors. With respect to the latter, the results are not clear cut for both the signaling 
and the portfolio rebalancing effect (see Ugai 2006, p. 43-44). 
In the 1990s, the Japanese banking system suffered from balance sheet adjustments due to the 
burst of the bubble and a large number of non-performing loans. As a consequence, several 
major banks failed or came into serious troubles. Under these circumstances, financial 
institutions´ funding costs increased dramatically: The spread between the 3 month yen 
LIBOR and the uncollateralized overnight call rate peaked in October 1999, declined 
substantially and remained relatively low until the end of the QE regime in March 2006 
(Chart 43).  However, the course of the spread over time casts some doubts on whether the 
BoJ had been able to influence yen funding costs at all since neither the ZIRP nor the QE 
regime are seemingly correlated with substantial declines of the spread (see Ugai 2006, p. 28-
29 and British Bankers Association 2009). 
When looking at chart 44, given the already discussed pattern of the CABs, it comes as no 
surprise to see a significant increase of the monetary base during the QE regime. M2, on the 
other hand, which is a rather broad monetary aggregate and is also used to forecast inflation, 
did not respond to the expansionary measures undertaken between March 2001 and March 
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2006. That is, the money multiplier that predicts the relationship between the growth of the 
monetary base and broader monetary aggregates, declined over time (see Oda et al. 2005, p. 
3). 
However, as stated above, the primary aim of the Japanese QE regime was fighting deflation. 
And indeed, in March 2006, when the BoJ officially ended QE by switching back from CABs 
to the uncollateralized overnight call rate as the main operating target, the price level had 
increased over the past five months and forecasts also signalled a continuing of (albeit only 
modest) inflation (Chart 45), thereby fulfilling the above mentioned formal criteria for 
abolishing the QE regime (see Ito 2005, p. 124).      
     
5.5.2.2. USA 
In the US, as already noted several times before, the primary motivations behind the 
introduction of the numerous new instruments were strains in financial and especially 
interbank markets, whose severity has been unprecedented at least in the preceding years. 
This development is also reflected in several spreads between certain interest rates, which 
serve as a measure for disturbances in interbank markets (Chart 46). Both, the spread between 
the 3 months LIBOR and the effective federal funds rate as well as the TED spread, which 
refers to the difference between the 3 month LIBOR and the interest rate applicable to the 
corresponding US Treasury security, widened considerably during the course of 2007 and 
2008 and skyrocketed in October 2008. After these hectic movements, the two spreads 
declined substantially again, which, as many commentators argue, reflects at least partly 
easing strains in the interbank markets. However, as in the Japanese case, from a purely 
descriptive point of view, the different measures undertaken by the Fed do not seem to have a 
noticeable effect on either of these two spreads. 
So apparently the Fed’s performance with respect to the interbank market is at least doubtful. 
But does the picture change with respect to the yield cure, that is, has the Fed been successful 
so far in lowering long-term interest rates? Chart 47 reveals that in the months after 
November 2008, when strains in financial markets had just culminated and the American 
central bank was about to announce its first securities purchase program, the yield curve had 
flattened considerably. By June 2009, however, it had soared again and is now at the level 
where it had already been in November 2008. Commentators explain this development with 
rising risk appetite of investors against a background of positive economic forecasts that 
makes them willing to shift from low-risk investments, such as US Treasury securities, to 
riskier asset classes like stocks. Moreover, they argue, are declining bond prices a direct 
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consequence of the increased supply as governments around the world currently face 
heightened liquidity needs. Yet as sound econometric analyses on the effects of the QE policy 
in the US are still missing, the conclusions inevitably remain purely descriptive and the 
explanations are only based on anecdotal evidence (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 05/12/09 
and 05/28/09).    
Finally, one has to pose the question to what extend the enormous expansion of the Fed’s 
balance sheet poses a threat to price stability, which is a frequently raised question. The story 
told by Chart 48 is that, like in Japan between 2001 and 2006, the pronounced increase of the 
monetary base did not result in striking growth rates of broader monetary aggregates so far. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
Especially after the Fed’s announcement in March 2009 to conduct outright purchases of 
long-term US Treasury securities in addition to its usual monetary policy operations, many 
commentators made oversimplifying cross references to the Japanese Quantitative Easing 
policy that had been in force between 2001 and 2006, whose most striking feature were 
purchases of  government debt (JGBs). However, as it has been shown in this thesis, the two 
approaches differ fundamentally from each other on four different grounds (Chart 49): First, 
the introduction. Secondly, the specific problems that the respective central banks tried to 
address with their QE regimes and that made these measures necessary in the first place. 
Thirdly, the main policy target. And fourthly, the relative importance attached to each of the 
two components (active and passive) of QE. 
With respect to the first point, when the BoJ decided to introduce QE in March 2001, it did so 
by formally announcing the introduction of this policy regime. So there was a starting date 
and the explicit reference of the words “Quantitative Easing”. The Fed, on the other hand, 
neither used the term “Quantitative Easing” in its official statements (also not “Credit 
Easing”) nor was there a formal starting date.  
Concerning the second aspect, one can say that although there are certainly parallels between 
the particular macroeconomic and financial environments that form the motivation behind the 
implementation of “unconventional” monetary policy measures by the two central banks 
under consideration, the differences in the economic performance are nevertheless the factors 
that shape the respective QE policies the most. In both countries, a severe recession was the 
initial driving force that made it necessary to deviate from the path of “traditional” monetary 
policy. Yet except from poor output performances, the two recessions not only have different 
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origins but differ also from each other with respect to the areas that were hit the most: 
Whereas the Japanese economy suffered from a prolonged deflation, the distinctive 
characteristics of the current US recession are severe problems within the banking system (to 
be sure, also Japan experienced major problems in the banking system. On the contrary, the 
US is currently concerned about inflation rather than deflation). As a consequence, both QE 
regimes are targeted at different (main) problems, which is, of course, reflected in the 
concrete arrangement and the number of unconventional measures introduced in these two 
countries.  
This leads us to the two remaining points mentioned above. Concerning the main policy 
target, the most salient feature is the fact that the BoJ switched from short-term interest rates 
to total reserves of commercial banks held at the central bank (i.e. the BoJ). The Fed, in 
contrast, keeps targeting short-term interest rates. It does so because the main problem is not 
that overall liquidity in the banking system is lacking but that the liquidity is not distributed in 
an efficient way as a result of “precautionary hoarding” caused by increased counterparty 
credit risk concerns and insecurity about the own funding needs. In order to deal with these 
problems, the Fed tries to engage with market participants as directly as possible to bypass 
malfunctioning interbank markets. Therefore it introduced a broader range of new instruments 
than Japan did between 2001 and 2006 and remodeled existing facilities. The expansionary 
effects of the newly introduced measures were sterilized in the first place. The BoJ, on the 
other hand, hoped that large total reserves might spur inflation.  
This leaves just the fourth point mentioned above: The concrete arrangement of active and 
passive QE. In general, both central banks widened the range of eligible counterparties and 
collateral. Apart from that, however, the specific forms of active and passive QE differ 
fundamentally. QE in Japan consisted to a large extend of active QE. To reach the steadily 
increased target for total reserves, the BoJ primarily relied upon purchases of JGBs. Although 
the Japanese central bank also announced that it will conduct outright purchases of Asset 
Backed Securities and Asset Backed Commercial Papers, the relative amount compared to 
other items on the central bank balance sheet remained not worth mentioning. Newly 
introduced facilities that can be attributed to passive QE in the true sense of the word are 
missing (also in the US, there are only few instruments that comply with the strict definition 
of passive QE). Only if one applies a somewhat broader definition of passive QE, it is 
possible to detect measures attributable to this subgroup of QE: First, the BoJ modified its 
borrowing facility with respect to the spread to the uncollateralized overnight call rate, the 
range of eligible collateral and the maximum number of days that counterparties are allowed 
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to borrow under this facility. Secondly, it introduced a securities lending facility in order to 
provide market participants with a source of assets that can be used in repurchase agreements. 
Compared with this, the American QE approach is fundamentally different. As noted above, 
this is owed to the fact that both central banks tried to address different kinds of problems. 
Concerning active QE, the Fed currently purchases significant amounts of GSE debt and MBS 
backed by GSE as well as long-term US Treasury securities. Furthermore, it introduced the 
TAF, which is comparable to “normal” open market operations with the difference that it is 
not directed at primary dealers but at depository institutions. Yet the American central bank 
has been the most active on the grounds of passive QE and a third pillar which it calls “direct 
lending to borrowers and investors”. In these two fields, it introduced a broad range of new 
instruments that all aim at engaging as directly as possible with as many market participants 
as possible to undertake to some extend the intermediary function that, under normal 
circumstances, is performed by the interbank market. 
Having in mind the Japanese focus on total reserves and the Fed’s initial efforts to sterilize the 
effects of its new instruments, one might expect a way more pronounced effect on the balance 
sheet in Japan than in the US. Surprisingly, however, exactly the opposite holds true: The 
BoJ’s balance sheet expanded by 35 percent shortly before the end of the QE regime in March 
2006, which is quite modest compared to the increase of 126 percent in the US. What is more, 
it took the Fed considerably less time than its Japanese counterpart to reach this dimension.   
The final question that needs to be addressed is how monetary and also fiscal policy in the US 
on the one hand and in Japan in the current crisis on the other hand compare to the way 
Japanese monetary and fiscal policy had been conducted in the first 15 years following the 
outbreak of the previous crisis in Japan.  
With respect to the US, it is possible to identify clear cut differences. Nowadays, there is 
consensus that monetary and also fiscal policy in Japan during the “lost decade” did not 
respond fast and decisive enough to the crisis. For example, although stock and housing 
market bubbles burst in 1990 and 1991, it was not before 1995 that the Japanese government 
introduced a bank bailout plan. What is more, even after the burst of the bubbles, the BoJ 
continued raising interest rates. As is generally known, it reversed the policy stance later on. 
However, only in 1999, with the introduction of the ZIRP, it lowered the short-term interest 
rate target to virtually zero. To be fair, although some of the decisions made by the BoJ and 
the Japanese government are questionable from an ex post perspective, they appeared to be 
the proper measures at the time they had been implemented, given the uncertainties regarding 
the effects that came along with the implementation of the until then unknown QE-policy.  
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Hence, equipped with the Japanese experiences, the response of the Fed and the US 
government to the current crisis is somewhat different: It took the Fed merely 16 months to 
lower its short-term interest rate target to virtually zero. And also fiscal policy responded 
differently. Taking the outbreak of the subprime mortgage crisis in March 2007 – a quite 
conservative starting point – it took the US government just a little bit more than one and a 
half years to initiate and pass a bank bailout plan (“Troubled Asset Relief Program”), which 
did inject a considerable amount of liquidity into the banking system. All in all, it seems as if 
the US has “learned their lesson” from the way Japan conducted monetary and fiscal policy in 
the 1990s and the first years of the new century. 
But what about Japan today? Here, the macroeconomic situation in the current crisis is a little 
bit different than the one in the US. To be sure, the Japanese economy has also been hit very 
hard by the global economic downturn. In the fourth quarter of 2008, GDP contracted with an 
annualized rate of 12.1 percent quarter-on-quarter, which is considerably worse than in the US 
(6.2. percent). And with the CPI fluctuating around zero, the threat of deflation is more than 
real again. Yet at the outset of the crisis, it seemed as if the Japanese economy would be able 
to uncouple itself to a certain degree from the developments in other industrialized countries 
since Japan’s banking system was in a relatively good condition after the restructurings 
following the previous crisis. What is more, its financial institutions did not have as many 
“toxic” assets to deal with as commercial banks in the US, for example. The BoJ responded to 
the current crisis by reductions of the uncollateralized overnight call rate (from 0.5 to 
currently 0.1 percent) and the basic loan rate (from 0.75 to currently 0.3 percent). It started 
lowering these key interest rates in February 2007, with a reduction of the basic loan rate. In 
October 2008, also the short-term interest rate target had been reduced for the first time in the 
current crisis. These reductions do not seem to be as drastic as in the US. One has to take into 
account, however, that the Fed started its target rate reductions from a considerably higher 
basis and hence had a much higher scope for these reductions. Yet these were of course not 
the only measures implemented by the BoJ. Comparable to the Fed, it started paying interest 
on (excess) reserves. Furthermore, it introduced new or expanded existing facilities in order to 
“ensure stability in financial markets” and “to facilitate corporate financing” (Bank of Japan 
2009f). It again increased its monthly purchases of JGBs, for example, which it already did 
several years ago; a time when QE was entirely unknown to monetary policy and thus put the 
BoJ into a pioneering role (Sheard 2009, Bank of Japan 2009f). 
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8. Appendix 
 
8.1. Charts 
 
Chart 1 
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            (The Federal Reserve Board 2009a) 
 
Chart 2 
maturity distribution of US Treasury securities held by the Fed 
(as of 12/20/2006)
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Chart 3 
maturity distribution of JGBs held by the BoJ (as of 06/08/2001)
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(Bank of Japan 2009c) 
 
Chart 4 
Currency in circulation and outright JGB holdings (01/2001-
04/2009) 
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      (BOJ Time-Series Data Search 2009b) 
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Chart 5 
the BoJ´s (total) outstanding amounts of liquidity-
providing transactions  as of 11/30/2006
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Chart 6 
Effective federal funds rate, target rate and discount rate 
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(Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009a and Federal Reserve Board 2009d) 
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Chart 7 
borrowing facility, effective short-term interest rate and target rate in Japan 
(04/1998-08/2003)
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(BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009m and MPMs for call rate targets) 
 
Chart 8 
required reserve balances in the US (1975-2006)
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Chart 9 
BoJ´s reserve requirements (1980-2006)
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      (BOJ Time-Series Data Search 2009a) 
 
Chart 10 
House Price Index (HPI,1990-2008, Quarterly Data)
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Chart 11 
Unemployment rate (%) and real GDP growth (%) in the US (1990 Q1 - 2008 
Q4)
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Chart 12 
Urban Land Price Index (1980-2002)
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Chart 13 
Unemployment rate (%) and real GDP growth (%) in Japan 
(1981 Q1 - 2001 Q4)
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Chart 14 
Spread between the 3m LIBOR and the eff. Fed funds rate 
(01/2007-11/2008)
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    (The Federal Reserve Board 2009o and Mortgage-X 2009) 
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Chart 15 
Effective federal funds rate plus target rate (01/2007-12/2008)
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  (Federal Reserve Bank of New York 2009a and Federal Reserve Board 2009d) 
 
Chart 16 
Spread between Corporate Bond Yields and the effective 
Federal funds rate (04/2001 - 09/2008)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009d) 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
 
Chart 17 
spread between 30-year fixed-rate conventional home 
mortgage rates and the effective Federal Funds rate (weekly, 
01/2004-09/2008)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009d) 
 
Chart 18 
US yield curve (eff. fed funds rate, Treasury securities, 11/03/08)
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       (The Federal Reserve Board 2009e) 
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Chart 19 
JGB target and CAB (target) during QE (03/2001-03/2006)
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(BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009d for CAB and Ugai 2006, Appendix 1-5 for targets) 
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Chart 20 
change in amounts outstanding of short- and long-term 
operations during QE (01/2001-03/2006)
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      (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009c) 
Chart 21 
amount outstanding of short- and long-term operations (01/2001-
03/2006)
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      (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009c) 
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Chart 22 
outstanding amount of short- and long-term operations during 
QE (01/2001-03/2006)
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       (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009c) 
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Chart 23 
maturity distribution of JGBs held by the BoJ (as of 02/28/2006)
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    (Bank of Japan 2009d) 
 
Chart 24 
Outright holdings of ABS (07/2003-09/2006) 
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     (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009e) 
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Chart 25 
changes in different types of OMOs outstanding (05/2007-05/2009)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009f) 
 
Chart 26 
active QE: Securities held outright, repurchase agreements and TAF (05/2007-05/2009)
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   (The Federal Reserve Board 2009g) 
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Chart 27 
maturity distribution of US Treasury securities held by the Fed 
(as of 05/20/2009)
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  (The Federal Reserve Board 2009h) 
 
Chart 28 
Discount rate, call rate target and the difference (08/2000-03/2006)
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        (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009f and MPMs for call rate targets) 
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Chart 29 
passive QE + "direct lending to borrowers and investors" (01/2007-
06/2009)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009i) 
 
Chart 30 
CABs at the BoJ (07/2000-03/2006)
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      (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009g) 
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Chart 31 
       
Stilisized Central Bank Balance Sheet 
Assets  Liabilities 
Autonomous factors  Autonomous factors 
Foreign currency, Gold  Banknotes in circulation 
Investment assets  Government deposits 
Other assets  Capital and reserves 
       Other liabilities 
       
Monetary policy operations  Monetary policy operations 
repos  reverse repos 
outright holdings of securities  liquidity-absorbing standing facility 
liquidity-providing standing facility        
          
       Reserves of banks 
       
total assets = total liabilities 
 
       (Bindseil 2004, p. 48) 
 
Chart 32 
total assets/liabilities on the BoJ´s balance sheet (01/2001-05/2006)
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      (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009h) 
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Chart 33 
Bank of Japan´s balance sheet during QE 
Assets (trillion yen)  Liabilities (trillion yen) 
 04/30/2001 01/31/2006 change   04/30/2001 01/31/2006 change 
             
Cash 0.29 0.19 -34%  
Banknotes in 
circulation 60.09 74.74 24% 
Gold 0.44 0.44 0%  Government deposits 12.27 6.08 -50% 
Foreign currency 
assets 3.27 4.75 45%  Others 7.21 6.33 -12% 
Others 1.15 0.65 -43%          
  5.15 6.03 17%    79.57 87.15 9% 
         
             
Repos 22.9 4.55 -80%  Bills sold 3.71 1.1 -70% 
JGBs holdings 45.78 63.79 39%  Reverse Repos 24.02 31.66 31% 
TBs/FBs holdings 18.38 32.14 74%    27.73 32.76 18% 
Others 20.08 46.32 130%      
  107.14 146.8 37%  Reserves of banks 5.07 32.93 549% 
         
Total assets 112.3 152.84 35% = Total liabilities 112.3 152.84 35% 
 
     (Bank of Japan 2001a and Bank of Japan 2006b) 
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Chart 34 
Asset Side of the BoJ´s Balance Sheet (01/2001-03/2006)
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
1200000
1400000
1600000
1800000
20
00
/0
1
20
00
/0
6
20
00
/1
1
20
01
/0
4
20
01
/0
9
20
02
/0
2
20
02
/0
7
20
02
/1
2
20
03
/0
5
20
03
/1
0
20
04
/0
3
20
04
/0
8
20
05
/0
1
20
05
/0
6
20
05
/1
1
year
10
0 
m
ill
io
n 
ye
n
Others
Cash Collateral for JGSs
Borrowed
Deposits with Agents
Foreign Currency Assets
Loans to the DIC
Loans
Bills Discounted
JGSs in Custody
Pecuniary Trusts
ABSs
JGBs
FBs/TBs
CPs
Bills Purchased
JGSs
Receivables under Resale
Agreements
Cash
Gold
Introduction of QE
 
(BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009i) 
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Chart 35 
Liabilities Side of the BoJ´s Balance Sheet (01/2001-03/2006)
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      (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009i) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 93 
Chart 36 
total reserves of depository institutions held at the Fed (05/2007-05/2009)
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        (The Federal Reserve Board 2009j) 
 
Chart 37 
 
       (The Federal Reserve Board 2009k) 
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Chart 38 
The Fed´s balance sheet before and during QE 
Assets (millions of $)  Liabilities (millions of $) 
 05/03/2007 06/11/2009 change   05/03/2007 06/11/2009 change 
             
Cent. bank liquid. 
swaps 0 165856 N.A.  
Banknotes in 
circulation 807377 907550 12% 
Gold 11041 11041 0%  Government deposits 14887 31392 110% 
Dom.+ for. curr. assets 41225 69864 69%  Others 46025 71007 54% 
Others (+loans to 
AIG,..) 40334 147567 265%          
  92600 394328 325%    868289 1009949 16% 
         
             
Repos 38750 0 -100%  Reverse Repos 40111 67108 67% 
Securities held outright 787183 1133524 43%  
suppl. financing 
account 0 199936 N.A. 
Standing facility 66 36888 55790%    40111 267044 565% 
Newly introduced instr. 0 516618 N.A.      
  825999 1687030 104%  Reserves of banks 10198 804365 7784% 
         
Total assets 918599 2081358 126% = Total liabilities 918599 2081358 126% 
 
      (The Federal Reserve Board 2009l) 
 
Chart 39 
development of total assets/liabilities in Japan (01/2001-03/2006) and the USA (12/2007-
05/2009)
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  (The Federal Reserve Board 2009k and BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009l) 
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Chart 40 
Asset side of the Fed´s Balance Sheet (05/2007-06/2009)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009m) 
 
Chart 41 
Liabilities Side of the Fed´s Balance Sheet (05/2007-06/2009)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009n) 
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Chart 42 
JGBs yield curve before, during and after QE
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     (Thomson Reuters Datastream) 
 
Chart 43 
Spread between the 3m JPY LIBOR and the uncollateralized call rate (01/1998-05/2006)
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   (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009j and HousePriceCrash.co.uk 2009) 
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Chart 44 
Growth of monetary base and M2+CDs (04/1998-01/2007, 
04/1998=100)
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  (BoJ Time-Series Data Search 2009k; note: M2 and M2+CDs are basically the     
        same. The distinction is of rather technical nature and has already been abolished) 
 
Chart 45 
core CPI, over the same month a year earler (01/2005-04/2006)
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       (Ito 2005, p. 123) 
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Chart 46 
different kinds of 3 months USD LIBOR spreads (01/2007-
06/2009)
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    (The Federal Reserve Board 2009o and Mortgage-X 2009) 
 
Chart 47 
US yield curves (effective fed funds rate, Treasury securities) 
as of 11/03/08, 12/01/08, 04/01/09 and 06/01/09 
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009p) 
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Chart 48 
Growth of monetary base and M2 in the US (05/2007-05/2009, 
05/2007=100)
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     (The Federal Reserve Board 2009q) 
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Chart 49 
 BoJ Fed 
target reserves short-term interest rate 
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8.2. Abstract (English) 
In the current economic and financial crisis, many western central banks introduced 
“unconventional” monetary policy measures, commonly referred to as “Quantitative Easing 
(QE)”. However, the Bank of Japan (BoJ) already applied QE between 2001 and 2006. This 
lead many commentators to make oversimplifying comparisons between the BoJ’s QE 
approach (2001-2006) and current implementations of QE by other central banks. In 
particular, this diploma thesis tries to examine the differences between BoJ-type QE and Fed-
type QE. It turns out that both approaches differ fundamentally from each other on various 
grounds: The primary aim of QE in Japan was fighting deflation, whereas the American 
central bank addresses mostly strains in the banking system. Concerning the concrete 
measures, one can say that QE by the BoJ consisted to a good deal of active QE in terms of 
outright purchases of Japanese government securities (JGBs), whereas the Fed currently 
follows a somewhat broader approach: Since interbank markets are not functioning as desired, 
it tries to engage with as many market participants as direct as possible. Therefore the Fed has 
introduced a much broader range of new instruments than its Japanese counterpart did 
between 2001 and 2006. As a result, the Fed’s balance sheet expansion was considerably 
larger than the one in Japan.  
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8.3. Abstract (German) 
Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Krise haben viele westliche Zentralbanken zu 
“unkonventionellen” geldpolitischen Maßnahmen gegriffen, welche gemeinhin als 
„Quantitative Lockerung (QE)“ bezeichnet werden. Maßnahmen dieser Art gibt es jedoch 
schon länger. Denn bereits zwischen 2001 und 2006 verfolgte die japanische Zentralbank 
(BoJ) eine Politik der quantitativen Lockerung. Dies verleitete viele Journalisten und 
Marktkommentatoren zu allzu simplen Vergleichen zwischen den derzeit praktizierten QE-
Maßnahmen und jenen der BoJ (2001-2006). Aus diesem Grund beschäftigt sich die 
vorliegende Diplomarbeit mit den Unterschieden zwischen dem japanischen QE-Ansatz und 
jenem der amerikanischen Notenbank (Fed). Wie sich herausstellt, unterscheiden sich diese in 
einer Reihe von wichtigen Aspekten: Das vorrangige Ziel der japanischen QE-Politik war die 
Bekämpfung deflationärer Tendenzen, wohingegen die Fed unkonventionelle Maßnahmen 
hauptsächlich zur Beseitigung der Probleme innerhalb des Bankensystems einsetzt. Ferner 
beschränkte sich die BoJ überwiegend auf den Kauf japanischer Staatsanleihen (JGBs), 
während die Fed einen breiteren Ansatz verfolgt: Da der Interbankenmarkt zur Zeit nur 
eingeschränkt funktioniert, versucht die amerikanische Zentralbank mit so vielen 
Marktteilnehmern so direkt wie möglich zu agieren. Deshalb hat die Fed weitaus mehr neue 
Instrumente eingeführt als seinerzeit die BoJ. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es wenig 
verwunderlich, dass sich die Ausweitung der japanischen Zentralbankbilanz zwischen 2001 
und 2006 im Vergleich zu jener der Fed in den letzten beiden Jahren eher bescheiden 
ausnimmt. 
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